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chapter 3
The De causis in Thomas of York*
Fiorella Retucci
Philosophische Fakultät, Universität zu Köln and Università del Salento
The studies of the last years on the medieval reception of the Liber de causis
have clearly revealed that, while the Liber de causis is a very important source
of metaphysical doctrines within the Domenican order,1 the work had been
read with suspicion and disinterest by the Franciscans.
In a recent article, Dragos Calma2 has ascertained this fact: Peckham quotes
De causis explicitly only seven times; Ockham uses the text in merely six occa-
sions (and in three of which he does not even openly indicate his source3);
Scotus refers to six propositions of the Liber in nineteen explicit quotations.4
According to him, moreover, the Liber is just a vulgarization of Avicenna, and
not a very good one at that.5
The situation does not change if we turn to the first Franciscan Mas-
ters, such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. According to the scholarly
* Iwould like to expressmydeep gratitude toDragosCalma for encouraging thiswork. I amalso
grateful to Andreas Speer, Loris Sturlese, Evan King and Lee Klein for carefully revising this
study and to the team of great scholars, who are working on the critical edition of the Sapi-
entiale within a joint program between the University of Salento and the Thomas-Institut
Cologne (Sabina Tuzzo, Marco Maniglio, Antonio Punzi, Coralba Colomba, Diana Di Segni,
Maxime Mauriège, Antonella Sannino).
1 For Albert the Great, for example, the Liber de causis represents the perfect completion
of the Aristotelian Metaphysics: see Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a
prima causa, II, 1, p. 59, l. 19–60, l. 5: Pervenit autem ad nos et Physica per eundem modum ab
eodemPhilosophoperfecta, ubi istum librum ‘Metaphysicam’ nominavit, tituli eiusdemquattuor
subiungens rationes. […] Propter quod et iste liber (scil. Liber de causis) Philosophiae Primae
coniungendus est, ut finalem ex isto recipiat perfectionem. On De causis as completion of the
Aristotelian Metaphysics see Libera 1997.
2 Calma 2012, p. 234–236. Calma 2012, p. 236 defines the Franciscans’ attitude toward the Liber
de causis as disinterest andhostility: “Ledésintérêt etmême l’hostilité de certains franciscains
à l’égard du Liber de causis restent plutôt énigmatiques.”
3 For the implicit quotations in Ockham, see Bos 1992.
4 Bos 1992, p. 180, adn. 50 also validates this number. See also the contribution by J.-M. Counet
in this volume.
5 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, dist. 2, pars 1, q. 4, p. 238,1–2: Ad primum argumentum princi-
pale dico quod doctrina De causis tradita est secundum doctrinam Avicennae erroneam […].
Fiorella Retucci - 9789004395114
Downloaded from Brill.com06/05/2020 12:23:11PM
via free access
the de causis in thomas of york 71
literature, these Masters use the Liber “abundantly,”6 but this turns out not
to be the case. Indeed, a straightforward analysis of the explicit quotations
shows how limited the influence of the Liber de causis was on both authors.
Alexander refers to ten propositions of the Liber7 for a total of eight quota-
tions in his Commentary on the Sentences and a total of twenty-one in the
so-called Summa Halensis.8 Bonaventure considers just thirteen propositions
of the De causis.9 He quotes this text explicitly twenty-one times10 and does
6 Saffrey 20022, p. XVIII: “Toujours est-il que, dans la décade 1220–12300, notre livre est abon-
damment utilisé et par Alxandre de Halès, qui comment alors pour la première fois les
Sentences de Pierre Lombard à Paris, et par le premier maître dominicain, Roland de Cré-
mone.” D’Ancona, Taylor 2003, p. 642: “Alexandre de Halès utilise abondamment le De
causis dans sa Summa Theologica […] Les citations du De causis das les œuvres de saint
Bonaventure sont nombreuses.” Bardenhewer 1882, p. 236: “Das Buch de causis gelangt
dabei [i.e. in Bonaventure’s Sentences Commentary] zu sehr reicher und mannigfaltiger
Verwendung.”
7 Prop. 1, 2, 3, 5(6), 11(12), 13(14), 16(17), 17(18), 23(24), 30(31).
8 The quotations in Alexander of Hales are distributed as follows (the page number refers
to the critical edition of Alexander’s Opera Omnia, published by the Quaracchi). 1. Sent. I:
Prop. 2 quoted at p. 117 and p. 118; Prop. 3 at p. 56; Prop. 5(6) at p. 38; Prop. 11(12) at p. 19
and p. 360; Prop. 30(31) at p. 385. 2. Sent. II: one implicit quotation from Prop. 1 at p. 361.
3. Summa I: explicit references to De causis: Prop. 2 at p. 86b; Prop. 5(6) at p. 492a; Prop.
23(24) at p. 61b and p. 76a; Prop. 30(31) at p. 104b and p. 107a–b; explicit references to
“Philosophus”: Prop. 1 at p. 183a and p. 484a. 4. Summa II, prima pars: explicit references
to De causis: Prop. 30(31) at p. 132a; explicit references to “Philosophus”: Prop. 1 at p. 503b;
Prop. 2: at p. 730b; Prop. 16(17) at p. 230b; explicit references to the secondary proposi-
tions of De causis: Prop. 13(14) at p. 502b and p. 547a; references to De causis, but called
by Alexander Liber de intelligentiis: Prop. 17(18) at p. 646a, 646b, 647a, 657a and p. 659b. 5.
Summa II, secunda pars: Prop. 1 at p. 17a. Summa III: Prop. 23(24) at p. 986b. See Prolego-
mena, in Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica, p. XCVI.
9 Prop. 1, 3, 4, 5(6), 9(10), 14(15), 15(16), 16(17), 17(18), 19(20), 23(24), 29(30), 30(31).
10 As explicit quotations (E.Q.) I consider: (1) quotations where Bonaventure explicitly men-
tions the title of De causis (fourteen quotations); (2) quotations where he refers explicitly
to Aristotle or philosophus without mentioning the title of the Liber (seven quotations).
In twenty one other occasions he quotes De causiswithout openly mentioning his source
(I.Q.).There are also eight passageswhereBonaventure says:quod recipitur inaliquoest per
modumrecipientis, nonpermodumreceptiwithoutmentioning a specific source. Although
the editors refer frequently toDecausis, I didnot take thesepassages into consideration.—
List of explicit (E.Q.) or implicit letteral quotations (I.Q.) in Bonaventure’sOpera omnia: 1.
Sent. I: Prop. 1 at p. 221a (I.Q.); Prop. 1 at p. 370b (I.Q.); Prop. 1 at p. 471a (E.Q.: Philosophus);
Prop. 1 at p. 638a (I.Q.); Prop. 4 at p. 167b (E.Q.: auctorDe causis); Prop. 5(6) at p. 390a (E.Q.:
Philosophus in libro De causis); Prop. 15(16) at p. 766a (E.Q.: Philosophus in libro De causis);
Prop. 16(17) at p. 165b (I.Q.); Prop. 16(17) at p. 765a (E.Q.: Philosophus in libro De causis);
Prop. 17(18) at p. 624b (I.Q.); Prop. 19(20) at p. 819b (E.Q.: Philosophus); Prop. 23(24), at
p. 526a (E.Q.: Philosophus); Prop. 23(24) at p. 646a (E.Q.: Philosophus). 2. Sent. II: Prop. 3 at
p. 452b (E.Q.: auctor in libro De causis); Prop. 4 at p. 33b (E.Q.: PhilosophusDe causis); Prop.
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not hesitate to openly criticize and condemn certain doctrines contained in
the Liber.11
The name of Thomas of York, an important Franciscan of the middle of the
13th century, rarely appears in the historical reconstructions of the reception of
the pseudo-Aristotelian book. Despite being “die einzige große Darstellung des
Systems derMetaphyisik aus derÄra derHochscholastik,” asMartinGrabmann
maintained,12 the Sapientiale is mentioned only occasionally in the introduc-
tion to the critical edition of Roger Bacon’s Quaestiones super librum De causis
(1935). There, the editor, Robert Steele, called attention to Thomas of York as an
important author who has used De causis in the 13th century.13 Steele is indeed
correct. In the Sapientiale, Thomas of York shows a deep confidence in his use
of De causis and quotes it several times. This is exactly what this essay wants to
show.
Written between 1250 and 1259/1260, while Thomas was at Oxford and Cam-
bridge, the Sapientiale constitutes a completemetaphysics of being, beginning
with an investigation of the existence, nature and properties of God, proceed-
9(10) at p. 118a (E.Q.:De causis); Prop. 15(16) at p. 865b (E.Q.: Philosophus in libroDe causis);
Prop. 16(17) at p. 39b (I.Q.); Prop. 16(17) at p. 559a (I.Q.); Prop. 29(30) at p. 66a (E.Q.: in libro
De causis); Prop. 30(31) at p. 55a (E.Q.: Philosophus in libro de causis); Prop. 30(31) at p. 65a
(E.Q.: Philosophus in libro De causis). 3. Sent. III: Prop. 16(17) at p. 691a (I.Q.); Prop. 23(24)
at p. 701a (E.Q.: Philosophus); Prop. 23(24) at p. 702b (I.Q.). 4. Sent. IV: Prop. 1 at p. 305a
(I.Q.); prop. 16(17) at p. 618b (I.Q.). 5. De scientia Christi: Prop. 16(17) at p. 35a (I.Q.); Prop.
15(16) at p. 42a (E.Q.: in libro De causis). 6. De myst. Trin.: Prop. 16(17) at p. 69a (E.Q.: De
causis); Prop. 16(17) at p. 81b (E.Q.: De causis). 7. De perfect. evang.: Prop. 16(17) at p. 195a
(E.Q.: Philosophus). 8. Itiner. mentis: Prop. 16 (17) at p. 310a (I.Q.). 9. Coll. in Hex.: Prop. 3
at p. 442b (E.Q.: Philosophus); Prop. 4 at p. 379b (I.Q.); Prop. 16(17) at p. 343b (I.Q.); Prop.
16(17) at p. 386a (I.Q.). 10. De Donis Spiritus Sancti: Prop. 3 at p. 496a (I.Q.); Prop. 14(15) at
p. 498b (I.Q.). 11. Comm. in Ioann.: Prop. 17(18) at p. 250a (I.Q.). 12. Sermones de tempore:
Prop. 16(17) at p. 352a (I.Q.); Prop. 17(18) at p. 271b (I.Q.).
11 See Bonaventura, Sententiae, II, dist. 18, art. 2, q. 3, p. 452b–453a:Quidamnamquedixerunt,
quod animarum productio est mediante Intelligentia, ut, sicut corpus caeleste ad produc-
tionem facit corporis humani, sic etiam Intelligentia ad productionem animae; et hoc plures
senserunt philosophi, et sensisse videtur auctor in libro de Causis. […] Sed haec tanquam
haeretica abiicienda sunt et ostensa sunt esse falsa, supra distinctione prima. Unde ver-
bumde Causis tanquamhaereticum est respuendum, nisi quis intelligat, quod anima dicitur
creari ab Intelligentia in hoc, quod aliquam illuminationem suscipit mediante illa. On this
point, see D’Ancona Costa 1995, p. 73, n. 1. See also Bonaventura, In Hexaëmeron collatio,
XI, 18, p. 379b:Unde dixit ille: “Prima rerum creatarumomnium est esse;” sed ego dico: prima
rerum intellectualium est esse primum.
12 Grabmann 1913, p. 191.
13 Steele 1935, p. XX.
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ing to a doctrine of creation, followed by an inquiry into the division of being
in general, and ending with a special metaphysics of physical being which
remains unfinished.
The method and purpose of the work are openly declared by the author in
the first four introductive chapters: first and foremost, the Sapientiale is a work
written by a theologian for the purpose of coherently systematizing the doc-
trines of the philosophers in the clear attempt to realize a synthesis of Christian
and philosophical wisdom.
Has autem utilitates et causas advertens ego minorum minimus elegi
opus sudore plenum, et propter intellectus nostri imbecillitatem et ipsius
operis difficultatem, de libris philosophicis congregare aliqua, que dixe-
runt de creatore et creaturis, quod estimo difficile propter eam, que pau-
cis facta est, philosophie communicationem, verorum cum falsis confu-
sionem, scientie sub verbis absconsionem.14
Thomas constructs his “incomparable monument du savoir philosophique”15
by collecting a massive number of theological and philosophical sources.
Among them, De causis surely plays an important role, as the following numer-
ical data demonstrate.
1 Quotations: Number
Thomas refers literally or explicitly to the Liber de causis one hundred four
timeswithin his Sapientiale. Moreover, there are three explicit quotations from
the Liber in the so-called Comparatio sensibilium, a work which has to be con-
sidered not as an independent work, but as a first, primitive draft of the Sapien-
tiale itself, as the research teamengaged in the critical edition of the Sapientiale
at the University of Salento has recently proven (see Appendix 2).16
Thomas knew, approved and used twenty-two propositions coming from
the Liber in his own work, as the dossier attached to this study shows (see
Appendix 1).
14 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 3 (MS Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr.
A.VI.437 [= F], f. 4rb; MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 6771
[= R], f. 16va; MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4301 [= V],
f. 4rb–4va).
15 Longpré 1926, p. 911.
16 On this point, see Punzi 2016.
Fiorella Retucci - 9789004395114
Downloaded from Brill.com06/05/2020 12:23:11PM
via free access
74 retucci
These figures alone might be sufficient to prove the interest of Thomas of
York in the pseudo-Aristotelian work. They becomemore interesting, however,
especially if we take a look at the influence of De causis on other authors—
and this time outside the narrow frame of the Franciscan order. Berthold of
Moobsurg, for example, explicitly refers to the authority of the anonymous
work thirty-nine times, by quoting just sixteen propositions.17 Meister Eckhart,
whose use of the Liberwasmore intensive, as scholars have shown,18 alludes to
just eighteen chapters19 of the Liber in eighty explicit quotations.20
2 Quotations: Attribution
Like other medieval authors, Thomas of York was convinced that De causiswas
a composite work that comprised a certain number of propositions and a com-
mentary to each of these. Thus, the propositions and the commentary are to be
considered as two independent works of two independent authors.21
Thomas of York, however, did not go as far as his contemporary, Albert the
Great22, in speculating about the composite authorship of the Liber de causis.
It is commonly believed that Thomas of York was persuaded of the Christian
origins of the Liber de causis. The starting point of this opinion, shared by emi-
nent scholars, such as Daniel Callus23 and Henri-Dominique Saffrey,24 derived
from an erroneous indication of Ephrem Longpré in his well-known article on
Thomas of York written in 1926.25
17 Prop. 1 [×4]; Prop. 1 comm. [×1]; Prop. 3 [×2]; Prop. 3 comm. [×8]; Prop. 4 [×2]; Prop. 5(6)
[×1]; Prop. 9(10) [×1]; Prop. 11(12) [×1]; Prop. 13(14) [×1]; Prop. 14(15) [×2]; Prop. 14(15) comm.
[×1]; Prop. 16(17) [×1]; Prop. 17(18) comm. [×5]; Prop. 18(19) comm. [×1]; Prop. 19(20) [×1];
Prop. 19(20) [×1]; Prop. 20(21) [×1]; Prop. 28(29) [×1]; Prop. 29(30) comm. [×1]; Prop. 30(31)
[×2]; Prop. 30(31) comm. [×1].
18 See Ruh 1996; Beierwaltes 2007; Retucci 2008; Meliadò 2013.
19 Prop. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(6), 8(9), 9(10), 11(12), 12(13), 14(15), 15(16), 16(17), 17(18), 19(20), 20(21), 21(22),
23(24), 31(32).
20 A dossier with all quotations from De causis in Eckhart’s works can be found in Retucci
2008, p. 157–164.
21 On this point, see D’Ancona 1992, p. 634–635; Saffrey 20022, p. XXII.
22 See Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis, II, 1, 1, p. 61, l. 65–68; De caelo et
mundo, I, 3, 8, p. 73, l. 31.
23 Callus 1943, p. 261: “[…] and even the author of the Liber de causis, who in the opinion of
Thomas of York was a Christian.”
24 Saffrey 20022, p. XIX: “Thomas d’York dans son Sapientiale range assez curieusement
l’auteur parmi les sapientes christiani.”
25 Longpré 1926.
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In the first book of the Sapientiale, Longpré found a quotation from a work
on the first cause (De causa prima) written by an anonymous, but certainly
Christian author:
Quare sequitur, quod Deus est, sicut exemplificat quidam de Christia-
nis sapientibus in libro, quem fecit De causa prima, quod “non existente
fonte essendi, nec erit fluens esse. Si enim totumesset fluens, nonhaberet,
unde flueret. Nec enim a se ipso flueret nec per modum circuli, nec per
modum infiniti.”26
Longpré came to the conclusion that the Liber de causa prima was, without
question, the work better known under the title Liber de causis.27
Despite the fact that the abovementioned passagemight resemble theword-
ing of De causis, Longpré’s assumption must be definitively be rejected. This is
because the passage from the Liber de causaprima is actually a literal quotation
from theDeTrinitatebyWilliamof Auvergne,28whowas certainly, and not only
in Thomas of York’s opinion, a prominent authority of the Christian faith and
Bishop of Paris.
Contrary to what Longpré, Callus and Saffrey believed, Thomas undoubtedly
ascribed the Book of Causes to one among the sapientes mundi. An indication
of this can be found in the fifteenth chapter of the first book of the Sapientiale.
Here, Thomas recounts that there is no conflict concerning God’s ineffabil-
ity between the philosophers and the theologians: the former are represented
by the Liber de causis, the latter by Saint Paul and pseudo-Dionysius the Are-
opagite.
26 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 9 (F f. 9va; R f. 23rb; V f. 8rb).
27 Longpré 1926, p. 897: “… et l’auteur du Liber de causis, dont Thomas d’York fait un chré-
tien …” Loris Sturlese was more careful in editing the 18th proposition of the Expositio
super Elementationem theologicam Procli by the German Dominican Berthold of Moos-
burg, where this passage from the Sapientiale is literally quoted: the Liber de causa prima
is not identified in Berthold’s apparatus fontium, and the source is indicated as not found
(non inveni) by the editor. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem the-
ologicam Procli, Prop. 14–34, prop. 18B, p. 48, l. 157–160 and note 28. Hudry 1997, p. XLVII
identifies the Liber de causa prima with the Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, since
the Liber de causa prima “parfois désigne le Liber XXIV philosophorum en Angleterre.” This
identification, however, does not seem to be convincing to Antonella Sannino (see San-
nino 2008, p. 262).
28 William of Alvernia, De Trinitate, 6, p. 40, l. 76–79: Eodem modo nullo existente fonte
essendi, non erit et fluens esse. Si enim totumesset fluens, non haberet, unde flueret. Nec enim
a se ipso flueret, nec per modum circuli, nec per modum infiniti.
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Nam videtur, quod sit innominabilis tam secundum sapientes mundi
quam sapientes Dei.
Primo per hoc quod dicitur De causis prop. 7, quod causa prima supe-
rior est omni narratione, quoniamnon cadit sub sensu aut ymaginatione,
cogitatione aut intelligentia, et per consequensnec sub loquela, sicut dicit
ibi Commentator. Ad idem agit quod dicitur prop. 23, quod causa prima
est super omne nomen quod nominatur, ad quemnon pertinet diminutio
neque complementum, sicut dicit divinus Paulus, quod est super omne
nomen, quod nominatur in hoc seculo aut in futuro. Unde divinus Diony-
sius De divinis nominibus cap. 1 dicit ipsum super omne nomen et intel-
lectum, quia cogitationes omnium existentium finemhabent, ipse autem
infinitus est, et propter hoc nullo nomine nominatur.29
Moreover, in the seventeenth chapter of the first book, Thomas declares that
the philosophers have identified God with the First Cause and calls attention
to De causis:
Deus est prima causa, unus omnium queque sunt, queque videntur esse
princeps et origo. […] Iam enim nominaverunt ipsum philosophi causam
primam, sicut manifestum est per plures propositiones De causis et per
rationes primi, quas supra dixi.30
Therefore, it seems that Thomas was persuaded that the author of the propo-
sitions was a philosopher. However, he was not convinced of the attribution of
the Liber to Aristotle, as was commonly held in the thirteenth century, until
Thomas Aquinas discovered the real origin of this text: in the Sapientiale, the
propositions are always ascribed to an anonymous author and the name of
Aristotle is never mentioned as the possible author of De causis.
As for the authorship of the commentaries, Thomas is evenmore hesitant: in
book I, II, IV and VI, Thomas speaks of an unspecifiedCommentator. In book III
and VII, the Commentary is clearly considered as a work of Al-Fārābī.31
29 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 15 (F f. 15rb; R f. 28va; V f. 12va).
30 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 17 (F f. 24va; R f. 37ra; V f. 19va).
31 The attribution of the Commentary to Al-Fārābī is well-documented by the manuscript
tradition of De causis. Among the mss. described by Pattin, eleven mss ascribe the Com-
mentary to Al-Fārābī. See Pattin 1966, p. 101–120, mss. n. 5, 7, 8, 23, 27, 53, 61, 66, 67, 77, 78.
Berthold of Moosburg was also convinced that Al-Fārābī was the author of the Commen-
tary to De causis. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam
Procli, Prop. 160–183, prop. 166B, p. 49, l. 89–90: Secundo ostenditur idem per Alpharabium
super 30 prop. De causis.
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Sapientiale De causis (Proposition) De causis (Commentary)
I book Auctor Commentator
II book Auctor Commentator
III book Auctor Alfarabius
IV book Auctor Commentator
V book no quotation no quotation
VI book Auctor Commentator
VII book Auctor Alfarabius
Another problem is closely related to this changing identification of the author
of theCommentary. Thomas is quite precise in quoting his sources.With regard
to the Liber de causis, he usually indicates the number of the proposition that
he is referring to. However, the way in which he quotes the propositions of the
Liber de causis after the fourth proposition changes. As is well known, most
manuscripts containing the Latin version split the long proposition four into
two different propositions, so that these manuscripts present an internal divi-
sion of the text into thirty-two chapters or propositions, whereas the Arabic
original comprises thirty-one propositions.
As the chart below shows, in book I and VI, Thomas refers to the text with an
internal partition that is closer to the Arabic original, i.e., to a text composed
of thirty-one propositions, whereas in book III and VII, he constantly refers to
a text consisting of thirty-two propositions.
Sapientiale, book I De causis
… sicut dicitur super propositionem De causis prop. 17 Prop. 17(18)
… manifestat propositio De causis 21 Prop. 21(22)
… que scribitur De causis 12 Prop. 12(13)
… declaratur prop. 14 Prop. 14(15)
Sapientiale, book III De causis
… sicut habetur De causis prop. 6 Prop. 5(6)
… iterum prop. 20 Prop. 19(20)
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Sapientiale, book III De causis
… sicut dicitur prop. 24 Prop. 23(24)
… ex prop. 7 Prop. 6(7)
… ex prop. 25 Prop. 24(25)
In book III, in whichThomas quotes De causis as being composed of thirty-two
propositions and the Commentary as being written by Al-Fārābī, Thomas also
attributes a literal quotation from Nicholas of Amiens’De articulis fidei to De
causis.32
To explain such variations, one might think that Thomas of York had two
manuscripts of the Liber de causis at his disposal: one that was structured
in thirty-one axioms with an anonymous Commentary, and another one pre-
senting an internal division into thirty-two propositions, a Commentary to
each proposition ascribed to Al-Fārābī, and transmitting the text of De arti-
culis fidei by Nicholas of Amiens. The latter possibility, however, is not com-
pletely unfounded, since the Liber de causis did not only circulate within the
Aristotelian corpus, but was often linked to the Liber XXIV Philosophorum,33
the Liber de intelligentis and De articulis fidei of Nicholas of Amiens. Of the
manuscripts that bear the text of De articulis fidei, I have identified eighteen
manuscripts, which also transmit the text of the De causis.34
32 See Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 8 (F f. 145va; R f. 152va; V f. 76rb): Omnino enim alia
est causa a causato, secundum quod dicit propositio De Causis 8: nichil est causa sui. See
Nicholas of Amiens, Ars fidei catholicae, p. 81, l. 16.
33 According to Hudry 1992, p. 63, nine of the twenty-three manuscripts which contain the
Liber XXIV philosophorum also include the Liber de causis.
34 1. MS Evreux, Bibl. Municipale, 79 (see Taylor 1983, n. 44). 2. MS Firenze, Bibl. Medicea
Laurenziana, Ms. Plut. 83.27 (Taylor 1983, n. 47). 3. MS Madrid, Bibl. Nacional, 489 (Taylor
1983, n. 85). 4. MS Oxford, Balliol College Lib., 112 (Taylor 1983, n. 111). 5. MS Oxford, Balliol
College Lib., 232 (Taylor 1983 n. 112). 6. MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. F.5.28 (Taylor
1983, n. 116). 7. MS Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 192 (Taylor 1983, n. 121). 8. MS Oxford,
MertonCollege Library, 140 (Taylor 1983, n. 122). 9. MS Paris, Bibl. Nationale, Lat. 6506 (Tay-
lor 1983, n. 144). 10. MS Paris, Bibl. Nationale, Lat. 16082 (Taylor 1983, n. 154). 11. MS Paris,
Bibl. Nationale, Lat. 16084 (Taylor 1983, n. 156). 12. MS Reims, Bibl. Municipale, 864 (Tay-
lor 1983, n. 164). 13. MS Tours, Bibl. Municipale, 247. 14. MS Uppsala, Universitetsbibl., Ms.
C.595 (Taylor 1983, n. 188). 15. MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat.
1041 (Taylor 1983, n. 200). 16. MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2081
(Taylor 1983, n. 203). 17. MS Zagreb, Metropolitanbibl., Mr. 97 (Taylor 1983, n. 237). 18. The
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3 Quotations: Distribution
The presence of the Liber in the Sapientiale is not constant. Even though it is
possibile to find quotations in every book—the only exception being the very
short fifth book—, the highest number of quotations are concentrated in the
first, the third and the seventh book.
This is, of course, far from being a coincidence, as a quick look at the struc-
ture of the Sapientiale reveals.
The first part of the work, which corresponds to the entire first book, deals
with God as creator and with God’s properties. In this part, Thomas quotes the
Liber de causis thirty-seven times.
The secondpart of the Sapientiale comprises the following five books (books
II–VI) and examines being insofar as it is being.The secondbookdealswith cre-
ation, introduces the problem of the first principles—that Thomas identifies
with matter, form and privation—and ends with a treatise on the transcen-
dental properties of being which are convertible with it, namely unum, bonum
et verum. In this book, there are eight explicit quotations from the De causis.
Arguments of the third book concern the divisions of being and the doctrine
of the causes. In this part, we find a large number (thirty-seven) of quotes from
De causis.
The fourth, fifth and sixth books discuss being as substance and as accident
and treat the doctrines of the categories and the universals. The presence of
the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber is scarce here and limited to six quotations.
Thomas intended the third part of the Sapientiale to be divided into two
books.We only have the first one, which concerns the world, the intellects and
the soul. In this book (book VII), a large number of quotations (sixteen) are
used to support Thomas’ point of view regarding separate intellects.
It is therefore possible to locate three main fields in which the influence of
De causis is especially relevant: (1) the properties of God, the doctrine about (2)
the causes and (3) the intellects.
MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 67 (Taylor 1983, n. 118) transmits just a fragment of
the Ars catholicae fidei after De causis and the Liber XXIV philosophorum (see Hudry 1997,
p. LXVI).
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4 The Properties of God as First Cause
From De causis, Thomas primarily borrows the identification of God with the
First Cause,35 which is not only the cause of everything, but alsomore powerful
than each subordinate cause that succeeds it. The metaphysical primacy and
the causal priority of the remote First Cause is constantly maintained in the
Sapientiale by quoting the first proposition of De causis.36
Thomas of York, following the intention of De causis, puts great emphasis
on the exclusive condition of the causal power of the First Cause, namely the
power to create, which is a power that requires nothing while everything else
requires it (see Appendix 2, n. 14–16; 30–31).
The causality of the First Cause extends uniformly throughout the entire
hierarchyof beings (Appendix 2, n. 17–18).God’s causality, indeed, expandsover
all beings that are.
He is also the cause of the causal power of the intellects. The First Cause
(i.e., God) truly is virtus virtutum, per quam est virtus in omnibus intelligentiis,37
since every power depends, as De causis says, on the First Power: “all powers
that are infinite depend upon a First Cause, whose infinite power is the cause
of theirs.”38 The intellects and their causal powers, although they are infinite
in a certain sense (virtus intelligentie non est infinita nisi inferius), are created
and thus dependent upon the First Cause, which has no limit (virtus vero primi
infinita est inferius et superius) (see Appendix 2, n. 35–36).
The complexity of the causal connections and the omnipresence of the First
Cause in everything does not weaken the unique transcendent status of the
First Cause. This is so for four reasons, which Thomas borrows from De causis.
1. The transcendence of the First Principle is so absolute that no-one can
grasp it: no name can designate it, no description can be made of it. The
First Cause can be known not in itself (secundum suam substantiam est
innominabilis): it can only be disclosed by its effect (ex effectu est nom-
inabilis) and signified by the other causes, which receive the influence
of the First Cause (non narratur nisi propter causas, que illuminantur a
lumine cause prime) (see Appendix 2, n. 2, 5–10).
35 See Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 17 (F f. 24va; R f. 37ra; V f. 19va): Iam enim nominaverunt
ipsum philosophi causa primam, sicut manifestum est per plures propositiones De causis.
36 For an overview of the philosophical content of De causis, see D’Ancona 2014, p. 141–157.
37 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 31 (F f. 37vb; R f. 49rb; V f. 30ra).
38 See D’Ancona 2014, p. 152.
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2. God as First Cause creates and rules every created being, but he remains
discrete (discretus) and unmixed (impermixtus) inHis ownunity (Appen-
dix 2, n. 12, 65–66). Although the First Cause is related to all of its effects
in the same way, the effects are not related to the First Cause in the same
way (Appendix 2, n. 67–68).
3. As the cause of every power, God is said to be absolutely perfect (perfec-
tissimus), since His substance and power are both eternal (Appendix 2,
n. 69).
4. The First Cause is the only simple substance (substantia nullo modo in
compositione et simpliciter simplex39), whereas all creatures are more or
less composite, their composition being dependent on their proximity
to the absolutely simple (compositio in hoc simplici est diversa secundum
appropinquationem differentem ad simpliciter simplex40). A long chap-
ter of the third book (cap. 28) is devoted to this problem (in ponendo
rationes seu descriptiones eius, quod est simplex, et proprietates, ex quibus
manifestumest quid simplex et quidnon, et quid summesimplex et quidnon
summe simplex). In this chapter, the influence of De causis is particularly
prominent, as thirteen explicit quotations testify (Appendix 2, n. 70–82).
5 Causality
Quoted more than twenty-one times within the Sapientiale, the first proposi-
tion of De causis plays a special role not only in the description of God as First,
transcendentCause, but also in explaining causality in general and the relation-
ships between the First and the secondary causes. The first part of the so-called
Sermo de causis41 is devoted to this problem.
In chapter eleven of the third book,Thomas dealswith the questionwhether
the First Cause is the immediate agent in every action or whether in any
action there is an intermediary (an in omni actione, non tantum creationis sed
etiam eductionis, sit ipse primus immediate agens, an in aliqua actione agat per
medium42).
39 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 29 (F f. 175va; R f. 178vb; V f. 103rb).
40 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 29 (F f. 175va; R f. 178vb; V f. 103rb).
41 The so-called Sermo de causis comprises the chapters 8–19 of the third book (F f. 145va–
162rb; R f. 151va–165va; V f. 76rb–89rb).
42 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 149va; R f. 155rb; V f. 80ra). An analysis of this text is to
be found in Treserra 1929, p. 48–49 and Reilly 1953. The text is quoted almost verbatim by
Berthold of Moosburg in his Commentary to Proclus (see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio
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Thomas introduces the discussion of this problem with the statement that
God is by necessity the efficient cause of everything. The causality of the First
Cause extends over all creatures, since the First Cause is more powerfully the
cause of everything than the subordinate causes (as De causis maintains), and
what causes the cause also causes everything else (as Nicholas of Amiens says):
[…] cum causatum omne causam habet et omne factum factorem et
omnis factor unus post unumreducitur ad factoremprimumtamquamad
agentem et efficientem principalem, tunc sequitur necessario, quod ipse
est efficiens omnium, et causarum et causatorum, utpote “causa prima
plus influens in causata omnia quamcause secundarie.” Amplius superius
dictum est quod “quidquid est causa cause, est causa causati.”43
After this premise, Thomas first calls attention to the opinion according to
which God is the only immediate agent and the only true cause; the creature
is by no means an agent but just an occasion for the causal activity of the First
Cause. Thomas notes that this opinion is supported by the authority of some
Christians and in particular by Augustine’s statements in his De civitate Dei,44
in DeGenesi ad litteram45 and in DeTrinitate:46 the Creator is the sufficient and
unique cause of every action; he does not admit any co-actor. This is because
the Creator is close to every creature, most intimately present to them, since
He alone can enter into the essence of the creature.
Et iam fuerunt aliqui, qui posuerunt ipsum immediate agere omnino et
non posuerunt creaturam agentem in aliqua actione naturali, sed tan-
tum occasionem, qua per actionem primi forma natura⟨lis⟩ inducitur in
materia. Isti autem suam opinionem confirmare uoluerunt per sermones
sapientum Christianorum, per quos uidetur, quod inductio formarum
naturalium in materia attribuatur solummodo actioni creatoris, secun-
dum quod dicit sapiens Augustinus De civitate Dei XII cap. 25. […] Hoc
videtur manifeste dicere De Trinitate III cap. 9, loquens de terre nascen-
super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Prop. 136–159, prop. 137E, p. 19, l. 145–p. 21, l. 211).
In the apparatus fontium of Berthold’s text, the indication Sapientiale V, 11 instead of III,
11 is only due to a different numbering of the books in the Florentine manuscript, which
is themanuscript followed and quoted in Berthold’s edition. On this problem, see Retucci
2011, p. 141–142.
43 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 149va; R f. 155rb; V f. 79vb–80ra).
44 See Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, 26, p. 382, l. 11–18; XXII, 24, p. 848, l. 57–60.
45 See Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, VII, 22, p. 221, l. 9–11.
46 See Augustine, De Trinitate, III, 7, n. 13, p. 141, l. 59–67; III, 7, n. 14, p. 141, l. 76–80.
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tibus, et dicens quod “extrinsecus adhibitis motibus creanda tamen Dei
virtus interius operatur,” inferius dicens de bonis etiam angelis, quod se-
mina noverunt, “et ipsa per congruas temperationes elementorum spar-
gunt, atque ita gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum incrementorum
prebent occasiones.” Et infra: “Sicut in ipsa vita nostra mentem iustifi-
cando formare non potest nisi Deus,” “ita creationem rerum visibilium
Deus interius operatur.” Ex quo videtur, quod sicut in generatione spiri-
tuali creatura tantum est occasio, ita in generatione naturali. Istam ean-
dem positionem muniunt rationibus per hoc, quod volunt creatorem
intimiorem esse omni creature quam ipsam sibi, et propter hoc necesse
est, quod intercipiatur tamquam agens inter omnem creaturam agentem
et actam. Amplius solus ipse ingredi videtur et penetrare essentiam crea-
ture, quare solus videtur perfecte operari in creatura. Preterea sufficiens
principiumactionis est ipse creator; quare in genere actionis non admittit
socium.47
However, this doctrine is clearly rejected by the philosophers, especially by
Averroes.
Sciat igitur lector inprincipiohancpositionemaphilosophia reprobatam,
secundum quod habetur ab Averroe super IX Metaphisice cap. 4:48
“Moderni—inquit—ponunt unum agens omnia entia sine medio, scili-
cet Deum. Et ista—dicit—opinio est valde extranea a natura hominis. Et
qui recipiunt huiusmodi ⟨opinionem⟩, non habent cerebrumhabile natu-
raliter ad bonum.” Huius autem opinionis desctructio patet per multa.49
47 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 149va–b; R f. 155rb; V f. 80ra). According to Reilly 1953,
p. 227, Thomas’ opponent here clearly is William of Auvergne, as Reilly tries to demon-
strate by quoting William’s De universo and De trinitate. However, we must be very care-
ful with this association. William, in this exact context, does not at all use Augustine to
support his own doctrine. Moreover, in a recent study on William’s doctrine of causal-
ity, Antonella Sannino convincingly argues that for William, created substances are true
agents that can contribute to God’s causal activity asmedia causationi (see Sannino 2004,
p. 46–47). Also for Teske 1989, p. 22–23 “secondary causes have the power to act; what they
do not have is an intrinsic necessity that wouldwithdraw them fromGod’s control.” A pos-
sible (Christian) supporter of the position criticized by Thomas could actually be Peter
Lombard, who quotes the long passage from De Trinitate III to conclude that sicut iusti-
ficationem mentis, ita creationem rerum solus Deus operatur, licet creatura exterius serviat
(See Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, II, 7, cap. 8–9, p. 363, l. 18–p. 364, l. 11).
48 See Averroes, Super Metaphysicam, IX, comm. 7, p. 38, l. 39–45.
49 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 149vb; R f. 155rb; V f. 80ra).
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Thomas then alludes to a second, more persuasive opinion, according to
which every natural agent is the proper cause of what is generated (natura
non tantum est occasio, sed causa per suam actionem naturalem in generatione
eorum, que fiunt).
For this viewpoint, shared by some sapientes mundi (i.e., some philoso-
phers), such as Averroes, Aristotle and Maimonides, the production of partic-
ular beings by educing their forms from the potency of matter is due to an
eductor, which is of the same genre and close to the educed being. But since
the First Cause, existing outside every genus, has nothing in common with
created beings and is related to effects always in the same way (as De causis
asserts; seeAppendix 2, n. 59), the differences present in the effectsmust derive
from the differences in the causes. This means: beyond God, there are other
secondary causes, which are responsible for the differences present in created
natures:
Ex hiis igitur habitis necessario sequi videtur, quod potentia naturalis,
quodque est principium generationis, vere sit agens et veraciter formam
inducens, et non tantum inducende occasionem prestans. […] Preterea
sicut dicit RabbiMoyses cap. 83,50 “omne, quod exit de potentia ad actum,
habet extractorem” sui generis cum eo, idest extracta. Alioquin quidlibet
extraheret quodlibet, vel adminus casualis esset extractio, ut esset conve-
nientia inter extrahentem et extractum in forma. Prima autem causa nul-
lius generis est cum alio, cum se habeat secundum unam dispositionem
ad omnia causata, secundum quod dicitur De causis. Quare, ut fiat diffe-
rentia extractorum in singulis generibus, necesse est ut preter ipsum sint
extractores eiusdem generis cum extractis.51
The creature is thus not an occasion for the First Cause to induce forms into
matter, since it acts as a true agent beyond the First Cause.
Igitur per viam illam patet, quod natura agens est sic agens, quod habet
formam apud se eius, quod fieri debet. Omnis autem sic agens est agens
non sicut agens per occasionem, sed sicut est verus agens, inter quem
et actum est essentialis comparatio inquantum huiusmodi. Quare preter
agentem primum est creatura vere agens. […] Hiis igitur et consimilibus
sermonibus liquet, quod nature non absolvuntur ab actionibus suis in
50 See Maimonides, Dux neutrorum, II, 5, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 42v.
51 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 149vb–150ra; R f. 155va; V f. 80rb).
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eductionibus formarum demateriis, sed quod sunt agentes medii extrac-
tores sive eductores, et non tantum occasionum largitores.52
For Thomas, the interpretation given to Augustine by the supporter of the first
position is, therefore, wrong. Augustine’s real intention was to sustain God’s
genuine contribution in the secondary causality as well as to affirm His pri-
macy in the production of effects in nature, according to what De causis says
in the first proposition. This means that an authentic interpretation of Augus-
tine’s words is possibile only in the light of De causis.
Scito igitur, quod intentio Augustini in sermonibus suis, cum dicit Deum
formatorem et formas induci per ipsum in inferioribus, est non exclu-
dere ipsum ab operibus secundarium agentium, immo potius attribuere
ei principalitatem, cum causa primaria plus influat, secundum quod dic-
tum est superius. […] Et hec est via respondendi ad omnes auctoritates,
que videntur attribuere formationem rerum immediate creatori.53
Hence, Thomas is able to maintain the secondary causality while at the same
time safeguarding the efficacy of the First Cause over its effects. God’s primacy
over its creatures does not imply the negation of a legitimate secondary causa-
tion in nature. On the contrary, even if the First Cause is sufficientissimus agens,
it wants to have co-actors (quamvis sit sufficientissimusagens, tamenvult habere
cooperatores).54
The first propositionof Decausisplays a special role inThomas’ doctrine and
his vehement criticism of a kind of Christian occasionalism.55 On the basis of
De causis, Thomas is able to combine the primacy of the First Cause with the
efficacy of the secondary causes.56
52 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 150ra–b; R f. 155va–156ra; V f. 80rb–va).
53 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 11 (F f. 150rb; R f. 156ra; V f. 80va).
54 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, III, 12 (F f. 150vb; R f. 156rb; V f. 81ra).
55 AsReilly has alreadynoted (seeReilly 1953, p. 226),Thomasof York is quite close toThomas
Aquinas concerning this specific topic, especially regarding Thomas’s statements in his
Commentary on the Sentences II, 1, 1, 4 and in the SummacontraGentiles, III, 69. According
to Freddoso 1994, p. 132 (who actually quotes Iglesias 1946, p. 102), Thomas Aquinas “was
the first scholastic doctor to treat this question in a special place, i.e., detached from the
problem of the cause of sin, and to extend it explicitly to all natural operations, whether
they be operations of nature or of the will.” This should not be the case, as the texts from
the Sapientiale here examined have shown. On Occasionalism and Aquinas’ criticism of
it, see Perler, Rudolph 2000, p. 127–156.
56 The same topic is present also in book I, 17 (see Appendix 2, n. 14–16).
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Thomas then describes in detail how the secondary agents work. He does so
in a long passage, which is quoted verbatim by Berthold of Moosburg in his
CommentaryonProclus’Elementsof Theology. Berthold completely agreeswith
Thomas of York on the doctrine of the causality of the secondary causes. Fur-
thermore, Berthold notes howThomas’ doctrine is close to that one of Proclus.
Thus, instead of implicitly quoting De causis—as Thomas does—, Berthold
introduces two explicit quotations from the Elementatio theologica in order to
confirm Thomas’ position.
Thomas of York, Sapientiale III, 13
(F f. 151vb; R f. 157rb; V f. 81vb)
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio prop.
151D (p. 137, l. 184–p. 138, l. 193)
Hii enim agentes quattuor operationem
habent, communem et specialem.
Communem quoniam in singulis operibus
nature concurrunt omnium actiones,
sicut supra dictum est, quomodo omnis
forma inducitur in materia per omnes
causas medias usque ad primam, et sic
per ipsam plus effluentem (cf. De causis,
1).
[…]
Habent et specialem, sicut superior
respectu inferioris. Nichil enim habet infe-
rior, quod non superior, instar ordinum
angelicorum, sicut ponit sapientia
Christianorum; habet tamen superior
proprium, quod non habet inferior, uel ad
minus non in eadem plenitudine. Ideo
actio uirtutis elementi aut elementati
actio est uirtutum omnium superior.
De primo sciendum, quod ipsorum
deorum quaedam operationes sunt com-
munes, quaedam speciales.
Communes inquantum in singulis
operibus naturae concurrunt omnium
actiones: omnis enim forma inducitur in
materia per omnes causas medias essen-
tialiter sibi subordinatas usque ad prime
bonum inclusive. “Omne enim, quod a
secundis producitur, et a prioribus et
causalioribus producitur eminentius” per
56.57
Speciales vero sive proprie operationes
sunt, quas habent superiora respectu infe-
riorum: quidquid enim operatur inferius
haec et operatur superius, sed non e con-
verso. Et de istis operationibus dicitur,
quod “omnis deus a se ipso orditur pro-
priam operationem” per 131.58
57 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, p. 30, l. 1–2.
58 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, p. 66, l. 1.
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According to Thomas, the metaphysical hierarchical continuity from the
highest down to the lowest level of reality is ensured by the existence of inter-
mediate causes, and through them by the primacy of the First Cause, as De
causis affirms. The chain of causal dependence reaches from the divine mind
to the lowest realm of material beings: the separate intellects receive the forms
of everything present in the divine mind in order to move the inferior bodies
and to imprint the forms observed in the exemplar into matter:
Ex hiis autem omnibus una cum predictis scire poteris, quomodo est
existentia formarum etiam naturalium in materia. Nam cum natura illa
inferior non mota non movetur, movetur autem a corporibus celestibus,
et corpora celestia ab intelligentiis, et intelligentie ab arte et secundum
artem, quam aspiciunt in mente divina, sicut dictum est, tunc intelligen-
tie inspiciunt formas omnium inferiorum in eadem arte prima, secun-
dumquam etmovere debent corpora inferiora, ut imprimatur forma, que
inspecta est in suo exemplari, in materia. Ex hoc autem aspectu speciei
in mente divina exprimitur ipsa forma in intuitu inspicientis, quam qui-
dem speciem secundum eandem artem, prout possibile est, exprimit in
motibus celorum et per ipsos in potentiis materie, in qua, cum est ista
forma in potentia naturali, natura mota taliter movetur ad forme expres-
sionem in ipsamateria per iugemet indesinentemexpressionemeiusdem
speciei ab arte divina in aspectu intelligentie, et ab acie intelligentie in
motibus et celorum virtutibus, et per ipsas in potentiis materie, quarum
expressionum singule, si vel admomentum desisterent, numquam forma
exprimeretur in materia.59
This doctrine is maintained by Plato, preserved by Avicebron, but strongly
rejected by Aristotle, who is more interested in the exterior appearance than
in the real meaning of Plato’s argument.
Ex hiis igitur patet, sicut videtur, quid impugnavit Aristoteles in ser-
monibus Platonis et aliorum sapientum, quia sermonem potius quam
intellectum, more suo volentes tractatores sapientie non sentire recte
59 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, II, 27 (F f. 86ra–b; R f. 95va–b; V f. 63ra–b). Berthold quotes this
passage verbatim (seeBerthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prop. 145F, ed. Retucci, p. 86, l. 158–
p. 87, l. 173), but lays more emphasis on the distinction between the separate intellects
and the motors of heavenly bodies (in line with Dietrich of Freiberg, as demonstrated by
Sturlese 1978). On the other hand, Thomas accepts the same distinction (see the chapters
10–15 of book VII of the Sapientiale, Appendix 2, n. 89–102).
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tantum, sed et loqui. Et ideo multotiens impugnavit sermonem Platonis
et non intellectum.60
This progressive realization through the chain of causes relies on two elements:
first, the separate intellects, and second, the Platonic ideas. Both doctrines are
supported—within the Sapientiale—with the aid of quotations from the De
causis. Both doctrines are, according to Thomas, completely rejected by Aris-
totle.
6 Separate Substances
Thomas dedicates six chapters of book seven to the doctrine of the intellects.61
Thomas has a clear view regarding the different positions concerning the exis-
tence of the separate substances. Plato and his followers speak of good dae-
mons, in perfect accordance with Christian wisdom and its teaching about the
angels. Aristotle, on the contrary, firmly denies the existence of any abstract
substance that is not responsible for movement.62
Thomas clearly prefers Plato and Christian wisdom: in addition to the inter-
mediate substances responsible for the movement of the heavenly bodies and
for the production of the natural things, he maintains the existence of other
intermediary substances (namely the angels of the Christian wisdom and the
daemons of the Greek tradition), which are totally separated and collaborate
in the divine rule of the voluntary acts of man:
60 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, II, 27 (F f. 86ra; R f. 95va; V f. 63ra).
61 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, VII, 10–15.
62 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, VII, 10 (F f. 224ra–b; R f. 249rb; V f. 180ra–b): Scito igitur in
primis secundum antiquorum opinionem, quod universum spirituale separatum et absolu-
tum dividitur in tres partes. Quarum prima est de intelligentiis, sicut posuerunt seu nomi-
naverunt eas Aristoteles et sequaces eius. Secunda pars est de substantiis, quas nomina-
verunt Plato et imitatores eius calodemones, sapientia vero Christianorum nominat eos
angelos bonos et sanctos. […] Secundam etiam partem visus est potius destruere quam
asserere Aristoteles, cum dicat XI Prime Philosophie non esse substantiam abstractam, que
nonmoveat. […] Etpropterhoc inprimis est persuadendum,quodest aliqua substantia sepa-
rata a corpore et appendicibus eius, quam non sit necesse motricem esse corporis alicuius
determinati, speculantem faciem primi et adimplentem imperium eius. Et hoc est osten-
dere angelum esse, secundum quod dogmatizat sapientia Christianorum, cum dicit angelos
semper videre faciem Patris, qui in celis est, et quod ipsum desiderant semper prospicere.
Quamvis, ut dixi, Aristoteles visus est hoc negare […].
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Et propter hoc, sicut sunt substantie medie in productione naturalium,
quas dicuntmotores celorum, sic necesse est ad providentie expletionem,
ut sint substantie medie ad eorum, que sunt hominum, hoc est volun-
tariorum, idest eorum actuum, quorum voluntatis principium est ordi-
natum cognitioni. […] Et propter hoc intervenit Deus humanis rebus.
Et quoniam hic connexus nature est per medias substantias, et ideo, ne
homines a divinitate repellantur, necesse est secundum eundem (scil.
Apuleius), quod sint quedam divine medie potestates, quas Greci demo-
nes vocant. Quare ex cura, quam habet Deus de hominibus, preter alias
rationes necessarie sunt medie substantie inter ipsum et homines, non
tantum ille, quas dicunt sapientes celorum motores, sed ille etiam, quas
dicit sapientia Christianorum angelos.63
To prove the existence of such substances, Thomas explicitly quotes De causis
in fourteen occasions. Thus, by quoting seven different propositions from the
Liber,64 Thomas of York neutralizes Aristotle’s objections against the doctrine
of the separate substances (Appendix 2, n. 89–102).
7 Platonic Ideas
Thomas sees the same philosophical battle lines when it comes to the doc-
trine of the ideas: there are two opposite fronts, namely the right position,
defended by Plato and Augustine, and the wrong one, as represented by Aris-
totle.65
According to Thomas, all Aristotelian objections against the Platonic ideas
result from a naivemisinterpretation: Aristotle equivocat in nomine universalis,
since he considered the universal forms just as abstractive ideas, i.e., as the
result of a discursive thinking, whereas Plato understood themas transcendent
Ideas, according to which everything is created:
“Universale quidem et totum non intelligibiliter, ut universale logicum,
sed intellectualiter. Universale quidem subsistens multis separabiliter,
63 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, VII, 12 (F f. 228rb–va; R f. 253rb; V f. 184ra).
64 Prop. 16(17), 6(7), 20(21), 30(31), 29(30), 27(28), 1.
65 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 29, in Retucci 2008(b), p. 103, l. 7–10: Iam nunc post hoc
tempus est inspicere, quae dixit Aristoteles contra Platonem, an eidem secundum veritatem
contradixerit, an non, maxime cum plura eorum, quae dixit Aristoteles, impugnare videntur
sententiam veram de ideis, quam tenet sapientia Christianorum una cum Platone.
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que secundum illud facta sunt.”66 Similiter et dixit ideam totum non ex
partibus vel in partibus, sed ante partes.67
Against Aristotle, Thomasmounts his defense of Plato’s ideal world, which is in
perfect accordance with the doctrine of the Christians (tenet [scil. sententia de
ideis] sapientia Christianorum una cum Platone), by explicitly quoting Eustra-
tios of Nicea and his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. The Byzantine
commentator, in complete conformitywithPlato andAugustine, indeed speaks
of a triple esse rei: in the divine, uncreated mind, in the created intellectual
being and in the matter.
Oportet te scire in principio sententiam Platonis memoria dignam, quam
recitat Commentator super I Ethicorum cap. 7 et VI Ethicorum cap. 8,
consonam per omnia sententie sapientis Augustini Super Genesim lib. II,
cum dicit triplex esse rei, in verbo scilicet increato, in intellectuali natura
creata et in materia sive in proprio esse, et quod esse primum est prius
duobus sequentibus et esse secundum tertio.68
For Thomas, then, there are three kinds of form: the form which succeeds gen-
eration, i.e., the logical universal; the form which exists before the singular,
createdbeings in the divinemind; and a third formwhich is present in the sepa-
rate intellect and functions as intermediary between divine ideas andmaterial
reality. The existence of the latter is openly criticized by Aristotle, but main-
tained by Plato, whose authority is, for Thomas, supported by De causis.
Si quis opponat impossibile esse ideam, quia impossibile est destructis
sensibus manere speciem et ipsa manet ipsis destructis, prout vult Ari-
stoteles II Metaphisicae cap. 8, iam solutum est per distinctionem speciei
superius datam, quod est species posterior generatione singularibus, que
est universale logicum, et hec non subsistit illis destructis, sicut dicit Ari-
stoteles, quod primis substantiis destructis impossibile est aliquod alio-
rum permanere, et est species prior singularibus, et hec non destruitur
ipsis destructis. Et iste species in suo esse primitivo et principali sunt idee
in mente divina, in esse vero secundario, ut sunt recepte in intelligentia,
sunt species sive forme, quas dixit Plato medias inter ideas et res sensi-
biles.
66 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomachean commentarius, p. 69, l. 97–100; p. 69, l. 4–p. 70, l. 21.
67 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 29, in Retucci 2008(b), p. 109, l. 222–p. 110, l. 224.
68 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 29, p. 107, l. 130–135.
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Et in hoc solvuntur argumentaAristotelis IIIMetaphisice cap. 8, quibus
impugnat formas medias […]. Supra enim concessum est, quod forme
abstracte sunt quodammodo per effectum in formis mediis, ut idee in
mente conditoris resplendentes in intellectu faciunt ibi species illas, quas
dixit Platomedias, secundum sermones, quos dixi tibi, quod “omnis intel-
ligentia plena est formis.”69
According to Thomas, Plato and Augustine are in open contrast to Aristotle
concerning the existence of these intermediate forms in the intellect, but they
are close toDecausis, where the existence of the universal forms in the separate
intellects is clearly established.
Dico igitur tibi secundum sententiam Augustini et Platonis, quod triplex
est esse rei, videlicet in mente divina, in intellectuali natura, in propria
existentia; et quod esse eius in natura intellectiva, anima videlicet et intel-
ligentia, medium est inter esse primum et tertium; et quod omnes forme,
que exprimuntur in materia, prius naturaliter sunt concreate in intelli-
gentia sive anima, quoniam natura pares sint, sicut dicit Augustinus De
libero arbitrio lib. II. Et hoc est consonumpropositioniDe causis, que dicit
quod “omnis intelligentia plena est formis” (see Appendix 2, n. 88).70
To sum up: in his defense of the ideal world, which linked the Platonic position
with that of Augustine, Thomas of York explicitly quotes Eustratius of Nicea. As
it has been proven by Carlos Steel,71 concerning this matter, Eustratius silently
borrows the doctrine on the existence of a triplex esse rei from Proclus, prop. 67
of the Elementatio. As a result of thismaze of quotations, Thomas—by quoting
Eustratius and by showing his proximity to Plato, Augustine and De causis—
intentionally or not, concludes by assimilating De causis to its original source,
namely Proclus’Elementatio theologica.
Far from accepting Aristotle as the author of De causis, as most medieval
authors before Thomas Aquinas did, Thomas of York was, on the contrary,
aware of an important fact: some doctrines transmitted in this text are in open
conflict with Aristotle. Some doctrines defended in De causis are close to quite
a different tradition, namely the tradition of Plato, Augustine and, through
Eustratius of Nicea, Proclus.
69 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, I, 30 (F f. 36vb; R f. 48ra; V29rb–va).
70 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, VI, 26 (F f. 205va; R f. 216rb; V f. 166rb).
71 Steel 2002, p. 53–54.
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Thanks to a special philosophical and analytical skill, Thomas of York reveals
a deep, precocious awareness that two fundamentally different alternatives
characterize thephilosohical tradition: Plato, Augustine, Eustratius andDecau-
sis represent the right option; Aristotle the wrong one.
The preference for the Platonic-Augustinian position some years later
became the identifying issue of another author, i.e. the German Dominican
Berthold of Moosburg. Hence, it is not suprising that Thomas’ Sapientiale was
revived 70 years after his death in Berthold’s Expositio super Elementationem
theologicam Procli. Berthold had the whole Sapientiale constantly at hand
when writing his Commentary on Proclus: he quotes extensively and verbatim
from the Sapientiale throughtout his Expositio. Berthold’s defence of the Pla-
tonic view—especially with regard to the Platonic ideas (Prop. 176 and 178)—
is far from being under the influence of the other members of the so-called
Deutsche Dominikanerschule, as Alain de Libera72 and Burkhard Mojsisch73
maintained. When writing against Aristotle in order to support the doctrine
of the Christian and Platonic tradition (sententiam veram de ideis quam tenet
sapientia Christianorum una cum Platone), Berthold just refers to Thomas of
York’s Sapientiale.74
72 See Libera 2005, p. 223–244; Libera 1992, p. 89–119; Libera 1981, p. 55–74.
73 See Mojsisch 1999, p. 267–281.
74 On this point, see Retucci 2008(b), p. 79–84.
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Appendix 175
Liber de causis Sapientiale Appendix 2
prop. I I, 13; I, 17; I, 24; I, 36; II, 27; III,
5; III, 8; III, 11; III, 12; IV, 16; IV,
19; IV, 22; VI, 15; VII, 13
n. 4; 14; 30; 37; 39; 46–48; 50;
58; 60; 61; 83–86; 102
comm. I I, 17; I, 24; II, 27; III, 8 n. 15; 16; 31; 40; 49
prop. IV II, 31; II, 33 n. 41; 45
comm. IV II, 31 n. 42–44
prop. V(VI) I, 4; I, 15; I, 23; III, 8 n. 2; 5; 8; 27; 51
comm. V(VI) I, 4; I, 15; I, 16; III, 8 n. 1; 6; 10; 52; 53
prop. VI(VII) I, 12; III, 28; VII, 10; VII, 12 n. 3; 73; 91; 100
comm. VI(VII) VII, 12 n. 99; 101
prop. VIII(IX) I, 22; I, 23 n. 23; 26
prop. IX(X) I, 23; I, 29; I, 30; II, 27; III, 28;
VI, 26; VII, 18
n. 24; 33; 34; 38; 82; 88; 103
prop. XII(XIII) I, 22 n. 19
comm. XII(XIII) I, 22 n. 20
prop. XIV(XV) I, 22 n. 21
comm. XIV(XV) I, 22 n. 22
prop. XV(XVI) I, 31 n. 35
comm. XV(XVI) I, 31 n. 36
prop. XVI(XVII) VII, 10 n. 89
comm. XVI(XVII) VII, 10 n. 90
prop. XVII(XVIII) I, 17; I, 23; III, 15 n. 18; 25; 62
comm. XVII(XVIII) I, 16; I, 17; III, 15 n. 11; 17; 63
prop. XVIII(XIX) I, 23 n. 28
prop. XIX(XX) I, 17; III, 8; III, 25 n. 12; 54; 65
comm. XIX(XX) III, 8; III, 25; VII, 23 n. 55; 66; 104
prop. XX(XXI) I, 23; I, 25; III, 25; VI, 20; VII, 10 n. 29; 32; 64; 87; 92
comm. XX(XXI) VII, 10 n. 93
prop. XXI(XXII) I, 15; I, 16; I, 17; III, 8 n. 7; 9; 13; 56
prop. XXIII(XXIV) III, 8; III, 11; III, 25 n. 57; 59; 67
comm. XXIII(XXIV) III, 25 n. 68
75 In this chart as well as in the analysis above I take just explicit or literal quotations into
consideration. Implicit or not literal references to the Book of Causes have been neglected.
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prop. XXIV(XXV) III, 28 n. 75; 78
comm. XXIV(XXV) III, 28 n. 77
prop. XXV(XXVI) III, 28 n. 79
comm. XXV(XXVI) III, 28 n. 81
prop. XXVII(XXVIII) III, 28 n. 72
comm. XXVII(XXVIII) III, 28; VII, 12 n. 74; 98
prop. XXVIII(XXIX) III, 28 n. 70; 76; 80
comm. XXVIII(XXIX) III, 28 n. 71
comm. XXIX(XXX) VII, 11 n. 96; 97
prop. XXX(XXXI) III, 27; VII, 11 n. 69; 94
comm. XXX(XXXI) VII, 11 n. 95
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Appendix 2: References to the Liber de Causis in Thomas of York’s
Sapientiale
Sapientiale, LIBER I
1. Cap. 4 (F f. 5ra; R f. 17rb; V f. 5ra)—Liber de causis, V(VI), 61, p. 148, l. 44–
48
Amplius, infinitum non est ab intellectu determinatum, quia finitum
non determinat infinitum, sicut habetur ab Aristotele II Metaphysice
cap. 2 et Averroe in eodem; quare, cum ipse sit infinitus, non est ab
intellectu determinatus, quare nec apprehensus. Nihil enim apprehen-
ditur ab intellectu, quod ab eodem non determinatur; quare non est
apprehensibilis, igitur nec scibilis. Hinc est, quodCommentator super
prop. 7 De causis dicit eum nec cadere “sub sensu” aut imaginatione
aut “cogitatione aut intelligentia.”
2. Cap. 4 (F f. 5rb; R f. 17va–b; V f. 5rb)—Liber de causis, V(VI), 57, p. 147,
l. 25–27
Et ideo dicit divinus Paulus, quod “invisibilia Dei per ea, que facta
sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur.” Nam “cuiuslibet substantie admiranda
propago, quantus sit, suus auctor ostendit,” sicut dicitur De articulis
fidei prop. 23. Unde “que in rebus” creatis “commendabilia contempla-
mur per effectum, per causam attribuimus creatori,” sicut dicitur in
eodem prop. 19. Et ita “per causas, que illuminantur a lumine cause
prime,” est ipse quoquo modo intelligibilis, sicut habetur De causis
prop. 7.
3. Cap. 12 (F f. 12ra; R f. 25vb; V f. 10rb)—Liber de causis, VI(VII), 64, p. 149,
l. 65
Prima igitur ratio ad intenti probationem est, quod quicumque ponit
principium unum aut duo, necesse est ipsum ponere ipsum vel ipsa
etiam utraque in ultimitate simplicitatis, quoniam, si aliquo modo
alterutrum eorum esset compositum, esset ex necessitate partibile et
haberet aliquo modo partes; quare neutrum esset principium, cum
utrumque multa haberet priora se, videlicet partes suas. Et fundatur
hec ratio super sermonemAristotelis VI Physicorum cap. 1, quod omne
compositum dividitur in ea, ex quibus componitur, et item super illud,
quod habetur ex prop. De causis 7, quod simplicis est substantia, que
non dividitur.
4. Cap. 13 (F f. 13ra; R f. 26va; V f. 10vb)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1
Nec est simile, quod ponit philosophia intelligentias regere mundum
sub causa prima, sicut tu postea scies. Nam etsi ipse regant, prima
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tamen causa non absolvitur a regimine, sicut dicit ista positio unum
absolvi a regimine alterius, quia “causa primaria est plus influens.”
5–6. Cap. 15 (F f. 15rb; R f. 28va; V f. 12va)—Liber de causis, V(VI), 57, p. 147,
l. 22; 61, p. 148, l. 46–48
Nam videtur quod sit innominabilis tam secundum sapientes mundi
quam sapientes Dei. Primo per hoc, quod dicitur De causis prop. 7,
quod “causa prima superior est omni narratione,” quoniam “non cadit
sub sensu” aut imaginatione, “cogitatione aut intelligentia,” et per con-
sequens nec sub “loquela,” sicut dicit ibidem Commentator.
7. Cap. 15 (F f. 15rb;R f. 28va;V f. 12va)—Liberde causis, XXI(XXII), 166, p. 181,
l. 68–69; 167, p. 181, l. 70–71
Ad idem agit, quod dicitur prop. 23, quod “causa prima est super omne
nomen, quod nominatur,” ad quem “non pertinet diminutio neque
complementum,” sicut dicit divinus Paulus, quod est “super omne
nomen, quod nominatur in hoc seculo aut in futuro.” Unde divinus
Dionysius De divinis nominibus cap. 7 dicit ipsum “super omne nomen”
et intellectum.
8. Cap. 15 (F f. 15rb–va; R f. 28vb; V f. 12va)—Liber de causis, V(VI), 57, p. 147,
l. 22; 57, p. 147, l. 24–27
Et hoc intelligi potest de nominibus, que non quia, sed quid. Sic
dicunt igitur, etsi ipse in se secundum suam substantiam absolu-
tam sit innominabilis, tamen secundum eius bonitatem ex effectu
est nominabilis. Propter quod, cum prop. De causis 7 dicitur:
“Superior omni narratione,” subiungit qualiter et qualiter non. Nam
“superior est omni narratione” “propter narrationem esse ipsius,” quod
est “super omnem causam.” Narrabilis tamen est. Et ideo subdit: “et
non narratur nisi propter causas, que illuminantur a lumine cause
prime.”
9–10. Cap. 16 (F f. 18vb; R f. 31vb;V f. 15ra)—Liberde causis, XXI(XXII), 166, p. 181,
l. 68–69; V(VI), 57, p. 147, l. 22
Deus est “quiddam invisibile, ex quo omnia, summum, eternum, in-
commutabile et nulli effabile nisi tantum sibi, bonum.” Et hec similiter
tangit causam efficientem et est Augustini Ad Mandarenses Epist. 79.
Igitur de invisibilitateDei dictumest. Quod autem “ex ipso omnia,” iam
hoc dixit Trismegistus Ad Asclepium, quod ex uno omnia et propter
hoc dictus est ipse “omnia.” Quod “nulli sit effabile” nisi sibi, indicat
illa propositio 16Dearticulis fidei: “Deus est immensus, incomprehensi-
bilis, innominabilis, ineffabilis,” sicut diciturDe causisprop. 23: “Prima
causa est super omne nomen, quo nominatur” et ipse est “superior
omni narratione,” ut ⟨dicitur⟩ prop. 7 […].
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11. Cap. 16 (F f. 21vb; R f. 34vb; V f. 17va)—Liber de causis, XVII(XVIII), 145,
p. 173, l. 45–47
Deus est, a quo exire est mori, in quem redire est reviviscere, in quo
habitare est vivere. Hec est similiter Augustini Soliloquiorum I et patet
ex dictis. Si enim ipse est vita, a vita exire mori est, et per contrarium
ad ipsum redire est reviviscere, hoc est motum vite recipere. Nam “vita
est processio procedens ab ente quieto et sempiterno, motus quidem
primus,” sicut dicitur super De causis prop. 17.
12. Cap. 17 (F f. 22va; R f. 35rb; V f. 18ra–b)—Liber de causis, XIX(XX), 155,
p. 177, l. 97–98
Deus est solutamens quedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione
mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsa, que predita nutu vel motu
sempiterno. […] Quod dicit eum “mentem liberam,” insinuat eum non
admisceri causatis, sicut dicit prop. De causis 21: “Prima causa regit res
creatas omnes, preter quod commisceatur cum eis.”
13. Cap. 17 (F f. 24rb; R f. 36vb;V f. 19va)—Liber de causis, XXI(XXII), 166–167,
p. 181, l. 68–71
Deus est sempiternus movens omnia immobilis et incorruptibilis,
altissimus, cuius nomen est benedictum et exaltatum exaltatione ma-
xima. […] Quod sit “exaltatum exaltatione maxima”, manifestat prop.
Decausis 21, que dicit, quod “causa prima est super omnenomen, quod
nominatur, quoniam ad ipsum non pertinet neque diminutio neque
complementum,” secundum quod dicit theologus Paulus Ad Eph. 1:
Super “omne nomen, quod nominatur non solum in hoc seculo, set in
futuro.”
14–16. Cap. 17 (F f. 24va; R f. 37ra; V f. 19va)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2; 3,
p. 134, l. 6–8; 4, p. 134, l. 10–12; 5, p. 135, l. 15; 12, p. 136, l. 39–40; 13, p. 136,
l. 42–43; 11, p. 136, l. 29–38; 14, p. 136, l. 48–137, l. 52
“Deus est prima causa unus omnium queque sunt, queque videntur
esse, princeps et origo”. Hec est similiter Macrobii in eodem et patet
ex antedictis. Iam enim nominaverunt ipsum philosophi “causam pri-
mam,” sicut manifestum est per plures propositiones De causis et per
rationes primi, quas supra dixi. Omnium autem causa est quoniam,
etsi sunt cause secundarie, tamen “causa primaria plus est influens
super causatum suum quam causa secunda universalis,” sicut dicit
prop.De causis 1, proutCommentator dicit ibidem: “Causa universalis
prima agit in causatum cause secunde, antequam agat in ipsum causa
universalis secunda” et “cum causa secunda agit in causatum,” quod
ipsam sequitur, “non excusatur sua actio a causa prima, que est super
ipsam,” “quoniam est causa ei.” Et propter hoc dicit una maximarum:
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“Quidquid est causa cause, est causa causati.” Amplius sicut manife-
stat Commentator ibidem “causa prima est plus comprehendens” et
“vehementioris adherentie cum re quam” causa secunda. Unde causa
secunda potest separari adherente prima, sicut separato vivere potest
remanere esse. “Causa etiam prima adiuvat secundam”, et “omnem
operationem, quam facit secunda, facit et prima,” quamvis efficiat eam
permodum altiorem et sublimiorem. Et propter hoc omnium causato-
rum est causa prima causa.
17–18. Cap. 17 (F f. 24va–b; R f. 37ra–b; V f. 19vb)—Liber de causis, XVII(XVIII),
145, p. 173, l. 45–47; 143, p. 173, l. 38–40
Deus est, apud quem est vita fixa, sempiterna in secula seculorum, que
nec finitur nec deficit. […] Hec est Aristotelis I Celi et mundi cap. 15.
Quod non tantum apud ipsum sit vita, set quod ipse sit vita, ex supe-
rioribus patet. Qualiter autem “vita” sit apud ipsum, per hanc proposi-
tionem declaratur, quoniam “fixa et sempiterna” et optima: fixa in sub-
stantia, sempiterna in specie, optima in operatione. Omnis autem vita,
que non est vita prima, est vita fluens et non fixa, quoniam est motus
et processus, sicut definitur vita super 17 prop. De causis, videlicet
quod “vita est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto, sempiterno
et est motus primus.” Vita autem prima est per se vita et omnis vite
causa et generativa vite et impletiva et divinissima, secundum quod
dicit Dionysius De divinis nominibus cap. 6r et sicut dicitur De causis
prop. 17: “Res vive omnes suntmote per essentiam suam propter vitam
primam.” Et ideo necesse est, quod ipsa sit vita fixa, nihilominus et
sempiterna, quia sempiternum dicitur, quod semper se habet ad esse,
et hoc dicitur necessarium, sicut dicit Aristoteles IIDegeneratione cap.
13a.
19–23. Cap. 22 (F f. 28rb; R f. 40rb; V f. 22va)—Liber de causis, XII(XIII), 109,
p. 162, l. 91; 110, p. 162, l. 92–163, l. 94; XIV(XV), 124, p. 167, l. 50–51; 125,
p. 167, l. 52–55; VIII(IX), 79, p. 154, l. 47–48
Tertia propositionum est, quod principium primum est sciens et intel-
ligens se ipsum. Cuius declaratio est ex propositione, que scribitur De
causis 12, que talis est: “Omnis intelligentia intelligit essentiam suam.”
Et causa est, secundumCommentatorem, quia, “cum est intelligentia,”
est intellectus et intellectum.
Modus autem huiusmodi intellectus declaratur prop. 14, et est, quod
“omnis sciens, qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam
reditione completa.” Et cum hec reditio sit “per operationem intel-
lectibilem,” sicut dicit ibidem Commentator, tunc “ad essentiam”, sci-
licet redire completa reditione, non est nisi essentiam suam perfecte
scire vel intelligere.
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Cum igitur “omnis intelligentie fixio et essentia est per bonita-
tem puram, que est causa prima” necessario, sicut dicitur prop. 8,
necesse immo multo fortius ipsa intelligit essentiam suam. Scit igitur
se ipsam. Hanc autem conclusionem nititur ostendere Algazel tract. 2
sent. 1.
24–29. Cap. 23 (F f. 29ra; R f. 41ra; V f. 23ra–b)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8; XVII(XVIII), 143, p. 173, l. 40–41; VIII(IX), 79, p. 154, l. 47–48; V(VI),
57, p. 147, l. 26–27; XVIII(XIX), 149, p. 174, l. 64–65; XX(XXI), 162, p. 180,
l. 48–49
Constat autem, quod priori modo non intelligit Deus, quia nec intelli-
gentia. Non enim secundumhuiusmodi opinionem intelligit per obiec-
torum presentationem secundum specierum vel formarum expres-
sionem. Nam “omnis intelligentia plena est formis,” sicut dicit prop.De
causis 9, sed de hoc dicetur in sermone de intelligentiis.
Secundi vero modi intelligendi vel sciendi duo sunt maneries: quarum
una est cum receptione, altera vero sine receptione, sicut si aliquis
videret solum intus suscipiendo, alter solum extra mittendo. Et harum
prima maneries est intelligentiarum, que intelligunt per receptionem;
receptionem quidem a superiori, non ab inferiori, sicut manifestat in
libro suo De universo et divinus Dionysius quasi per totum Hierarchie
angelice.
Hanc autem receptionem et modum eius manifestat prop. De causis
19, cumdicit: “res omnes intelligibiles habent scientiampropter intelli-
gentiamprimam,” quia, sicut fixio intelligentie est per causamprimam,
prout dicit alia prop. 8—scilicet “omnis intelligentiae fixio et essen-
tia est per bonitatem puram, que est causa prima”—, sic et scientia
eiusdemest per eandem, prout dicitprop. 9: cause secunde “illuminan-
tur a lumine cause prime.” “Recipit” enim intelligentia “ex bonitatibus
primis, que procedunt ex causa prima, receptionemmultam,” sicut di-
citur prop. 20.
Causam vero primam, quia “dives est per se” ipsam et “magis dives,”
sicut dicitur prop. 21, impossibile est intelligere per receptionem, alio-
quin non esset prima, sicut manifestum est supra in propositionibus
de quidditate Dei. Impossibile enim est ipsam aliquid recipere, quia
impossibile est aliquem ei aliquid dare, sicut dicit theologia nostra:
“Quis dedit ei et retribuetur ei?”
30–31. Cap. 24 (F f. 30va; R f. 42rb–va;V f. 24rb)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2;
17, p. 137, l. 59–60
Errorem autem alium, quo dixerunt aliqui scire Deum omnia scientia
universali et non particulari, recitat Averroes super XI Prime Philoso-
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phie cap. 24 Et hic error destruitur per tres propositiones. […] Ter-
tia est, quod “omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum
suum quam causa secundaria,” sicut dicitur De causis prop. 1. Nam
quod influit secunda, hoc debetur prime, sicut dicit ibidem Commen-
tator. Ex quibus sequitur, quod prima causa verius est causa omnis
causati quam aliqua secundaria, et ideo ipsa est verius principium
cognoscendi quam aliqua alia, sicut essendi.
32. Cap. 25 (F f. 31vb; R f. 43va;V f. 25rb)—Liber de causis, XX(XXI), 162, p. 180,
l. 48–49
Ita apud primum sunt claves omnium scientiarum, quia ab ipso pro-
cedit scientia et cognitio omnium, sicut dicit unus de sapientibus no-
stris: “Omnis sapientia a domino Deo est.” Et item pertractat exem-
plum: sicut regem, apud quem sunt claves thesaurorum, inconveniens
est non appellare divitem, ita eum, apud quem sunt claves omnium
scientiarum, inconveniens est non appellare scientem. Si enim dives
dicitur, qui habundanter recipit, multo fortius et qui distribuit. Ita est
de Deo sciente. Ideo scribitur prop. De causis, quod “primus est dives
per se ipsum et est magis dives.”
33. Cap. 29 (F f. 34va; R f. 46ra; V f. 27va; ed. Retucci 103, l. 30–104, l. 40)—
Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158, l. 8
Modus autem ponendi ideam intra intellectum creatum est duplex,
quorum unus est verus et alter falsus. Verus, ut si intelligamus intelli-
gentias separatas tamquam “artes plures sub una arte divina” uniformi,
sicut vult Averroes super XI cap. 6, et movere celos ac per hoc diversas
agere dispositiones in hiis, que sub celis sunt, secundum illas species
divinas seu ideas, quas inspiciunt indivinamente, que resultant in ipsis
inspicientibus, tunc possumus dicere illas species secundas, que resul-
tant ex speciebus primis in mentibus intelligentiarum, aliquo modo
ideas, licet secundario. Et huic est consona illa propositio De causis,
quod “omnis intelligentia plena est formis.” Hinc est, quod intelligen-
tia et anima, cum omnes forme eius actu sint in ipsa, dicitur seculum
intellegibile secundum Avicenna lib. ⟨VIII⟩ cap. ⟨7⟩.
34. Cap. 30 (F f. 36vb; R f. 48ra; V f. 29va)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8
Et in hoc solvuntur argumentaAristotelis IIIMetaphisice cap. 8, quibus
impugnat formas medias […]. Supra enim concessum est, quod forme
abstracte sunt quodammodo per effectum in formis mediis, ut idee in
mente conditoris resplendentes in intellectu faciunt ibi species illas,
quas dixit Plato medias, secundum sermones, quos dixi tibi, quod
“omnis intelligentia plena est formis.”
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35–36. Cap. 31 (F f. 37vb; R f. 49rb;V f. 30ra)—Liber de causis, XV(XVI), 129, p. 168,
l. 70–71; 131–132, p. 169, l. 79–87
Est igitur secundum ante dicta potentissimus, secundum quod dicit
Seneca Epistula 60d: “Maior est”—inquit—“et potentior cunctis.” […]
Nam virtus primi est virtus virtutum, per quam est virtus in omnibus
intelligentiis, sicut habetur De causis prop. 17: “Omnes virtutes, quibus
non est finis, sunt per infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum,”
quoniam virtus intelligentie non est infinita nisi inferius, virtus vero
primi infinita est inferius et superius, et ex se ipsa, secundum Com-
mentatorem, et propter hoc est potentior omnibus virtutibus. Unde et
merito dicitur “Dominus virtutum” a quodam de sapientibus nostris.
Est igitur virtuosissimus et potentissimus.
37. Cap. 36 (F f. 41vb; R f. 53ra; V f. 33rb)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2
Hec autem ratio perficietur ex dicendis, cum videtur sequi ex hoc,
quod hoc necesse est habere rectorem seu providentem, cui magis
est ascribendum regimen quam istis, cum “omnis causa primaria plus
influat in causatum, quam secundaria,” sicut dicitur prop. De causis 1.
Sapientiale, LIBER II
38. Cap. 27 (F f. 86ra; R f. 95va; V f. 63ra)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8
Accipe aliam, que est eiusdem libro III cap. 26, quod omnis forma infe-
rior est in superiori, ac per hoc omnes forme inferiores sunt in intelli-
gentia secundum esse nobilius, sicut habetur ab eodem libro III cap.
23, 26, 27 et 38, et prout dicit prop.De causis, quod “omnis intelligentia
plena est formis.”
39–40. Cap. 27 (F f. 86va; R f. 96ra; V f. 63va)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2;
12, p. 136, l. 41
Si quis autem querat, an ipse primus debeat dici dator forme, intel-
ligat hoc ex prop. De causis 1, que est quod “omnis causa primaria
plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa secunda;” et ideo
“vehementius est causa rei quam propinqua,” sicut dicit ibidem Com-
mentator. Et iam patuit hoc ex sermonibus Avencebrolis. Et propter
hoc ipse dicetur verissime dator forme. Unde sapientes Christiano-
rum nominaverunt eum formatorem materie, sicut Augustinus Super
Genesim VIII cap. 11; immo forma omnium, sicut idem De religione,
propter hoc, quod omnes numeri formarum formantur a prima forma
intellegibili, secundum quod dicit idem De civitate Dei libro X cap.
17.
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41–44. Cap. 31 (F f. 90rb; R f. 99vb–100ra;V f. 67rb)—Liber de causis, IV, 37, p. 142,
l. 37–38; 42, p. 142, l. 51–53; 38, p. 142, l. 39–41; 39, p. 142, l. 42–43; 40, p. 142,
l. 45–46; 41, p. 142, l. 47–48
Primum autem compositum non est aliud quam existentia prime
forme in materia prima. Quapropter primum compositum esse est
secundum prop. De causis 4, quod “prima rerum creatarum est esse
et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud.”
Quod autem oportet hic intelligere nomine esse compositum illud,
manifestum est per ante dictum, quia nec materia per se nec forma
per se est esse, aut habet esse.
Hoc similiter patet perCommentatorem in eodem loco, qui dicit, quod
hoc esse, quamvis sit simplex a Deo, quod non sit “creatum simplicius
eo”—creatum dico, quod sit actu ens—, “tamen compositum est ex
finito et infinito” et ex materia et forma. Hinc etiam est manifestum,
quod oportet extendere hic nomen creationis ad nomen compositio-
nis.
Quod autem hoc esse sit primum illud, de quo dixi, manifestat idem
Commentator per hoc, quod dicit, quod est “supra sensum, supra ani-
mam, supra intelligentiam et non est esse post hanc causam primam
neque prius creatum ipso.” Ecce etiam quod dixit esse et esse composi-
tum, nunc dicit causam. Quod autem ipsum sit supremum, dicit, cum
adiungit, quod est “superius rebus creatis, omnibus vehementius,” et
hoc tantum est “propter suam propinquitatem ad causam primam.”
Istud etiam, quamvis sit unum, propter hoc, quod est propinquum “uni
vero, in quo non est multitudo aliquo modorum,” tamenmultiplicatur
et fit multa, quia ipsum est compositum, secundum quod dicitur in
eodem loco.
45. Cap. 33 (F f. 92rb; R f. 102ra; V f. 96va)—Liber de causis, IV, 37, p. 142,
l. 37–38
Amplius, quomodo primum rerum creatarum erit accidens? Iam enim
audisti, quod “primum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum crea-
tum aliud,” secundum prop. De causis 4.
Sapientiale, LIBER III
46. Cap. 5 (F f. 143va; R f. 149rb; V f. 74va)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1
Amplius, sicut accommodatur ratio necessitatis rebus possibilibus
secundum se quantum ad intentionem essentie, similiter quantum
ad intentionem cause. Nam cum nomen cause attribuitur causatis,
unde et dicuntur cause secundarie, sicut manifestum est ex De causis
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prop. 1 et aliis locis plurimis, et necessitas attribuitur cause respectu
causati, secundum quod dicit Avicenna VI Metaphysice cap. 4, propter
hoc sicut est causa duplex, prima, que est simpliciter causa, et secun-
daria, que est per primam, ita necessitas duplex in ratione causandi:
una, que attribuitur cause prime respectu omnis causati; alia, que
attribuitur cause secundarie respectu proprii causati, quia omnino
necessitas attribuitur cause respectu sui causati, secundum quod dicit
Avicenna in eodem.
47–49. Cap. 8 (F f. 146rb; R f. 152ra; V f. 76vb–77ra)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134,
l. 1–2; 1, p. 134, l. 1–2; 2, p. 134, l. 2–5; 2, p. 134, l. 6–9; 4, p. 134, l. 10–12;
14, p. 136, l. 48–137, l. 49; 16, p. 137, l. 57–58; 17, p. 137, l. 59–60; 14, p. 137,
l. 51–52; 15, p. 137, l. 55–56; 7–11, p. 135, l. 19–136, l. 38
Scias igitur, quod causas divisionis habet plurimas. Quarum una est,
quod causarum alia primaria, alia secundaria, alia naturalis, alia arti-
ficialis, alia secundum naturam, alia supra naturam, alia adiutrix, alia
preparatrix, alia exemplaris, alia exemplata, alia essentialis, alia acci-
dentalis, alia propinqua, alia remota, alia propria, alia communis, alia
particularis, alia universalis, alia simplex, alia composita, alia in poten-
tia, alia in effectu, secundum quod manifestabo tibi breviter omnes
illas differentias. Prima igitur divisio est in causamprimariamet secun-
dariam, secundum quod habetur ex prop. De causis 1. Causa autem
primaria duplicem habet rationem respectu secundarie: unam, quod
est causati secundarie cause operativa; secunda, quod non tantum est
operativa, sed est magis operativa. Primum est manifestum per prop.
1 De articulis fidei, que est, quod “quicquid est causa cause, est causa
causati”, et per communem animi conceptionem, que premittitur, sci-
licet quod “omnis res habet esse per id, quod causam eius ad esse
perducit.” Secundum est manifestum per prop. De causis 1, que est,
quod “omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum
quam causa secunda universalis,” sicut exponitur ibidem ab Alfara-
bio: primo, quod ad remotionem cause secunde non sequitur remotio
cause prime nec virtutis eius. Secundo, quod “causa prima prius agit
in causatum secundum cause secunde, antequam agat in ipsum causa
secunda, que sequitur eam.” Tertio, quod si “causa secunda agit” in
causatum suum, non excusatur “a causa prima, que est supra ipsam”
et “causa ei,” sed “causa prima ipsam secundam adiuvat super opera-
tionemsuam.”Quinto (sic!), quod “non figitur causatumsecunde cause
nisi per virtutemcauseprime,” quia causa secundaria operatur ex influ-
entia cause primarie. Sexto, quod causa prima “efficit eam per modum
altiorem et sublimorem.” Octavo (sic!), quod “causa prima est maioris
Fiorella Retucci - 9789004395114
Downloaded from Brill.com06/05/2020 12:23:11PM
via free access
104 retucci
et vehementioris adherentie cum re quam causa propinqua.” Et hec
omnia sunt manifesta in exemplo, quod ponit in esse vivo homine:
“vivum est causa hominis propinqua, esse longinqua,” unde est “causa
vehementior hominis quam vivum,” quia ablato vivo adhuc remanet
esse.
50. Cap. 8 (F f. 146va; R f. 152rb; V f. 77rb)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2
Nempe etsi sint medii factori, reducuntur tamen ad factorem primum,
qui est factor mediorum et verus operator eorundem. Et ideo ipse est
causa ultima omnium efficientium. Valet ad huius rationis confirma-
tionem, quod superius dixi de causa primaria, “quod est plus influens
quam causa secunda.”
51–57. Cap. 8 (F f. 146rb–va; R f. 152rb; V f. 77ra–b)—Liber de causis, V(VI), 57,
p. 147, l. 22–27; V(VI), 61, p. 148, l. 44–48; V(VI), 58, p. 147, l. 28–31; XIX(XX),
155, p. 177, l. 97–98; 156, p. 177, l. 99–2; 157, p. 177, l. 3–4; XXI(XXII), 166–
167, p. 181, l. 68–71; XXIII(XXIV), 176, p. 185, l. 20–23
Amplius, sicut habetur ex prop. De causis 6: “Prima causa superior est
narratione, et non deficiunt lingue a narratione eius nisi propter nar-
rationem esse ipius, quoniam ipsa est super omnem causam, et non
narratur ⟨nisi⟩ per secundas causas, que illuminantur lumine cause
prime.” Et ratio est secundumAlfarabium, quia cum sit superior omni-
bus, omnia excedit, sensumet intelligentiamet per consequens vocem.
Preterea ex commento ibidem habetur, quod “causa prima est, que
noncessat illuminare causatumsuum, et ipsanon illuminatur a lumine
alio, quia ipsa est lumenpurum, supra quodnon est lumen.” Itemprop.
20dicitur, quod “causa prima regit res creatas omnes, preter quod com-
miscetur cum eis.” Et est ratio secundum Alfarabium, “quia regimen
non debilitat unitatem eius” nec perturbat essentiam. Unde regens est
“stans fixa cum unitate sua prima.”
Preterea “causa prima est super omne nomen, quod nominatur, quo-
niam non pertinet ei diminutio neque complementum.” Hoc similiter
ex superioribus est manifestum.
Amplius “causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum disposi-
tionem unam, sed res omnes non existunt in prima secundum unam
dispositionem,” sicut dicitur prop. 24.
58. Cap. 11 (F f. 150ra; R f. 155va; V f. 80rb)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2
Et cum hoc ita sit, volo te scire, quod principium non tantum est agens
et efficiens aliquorum et aliquorum non, cuius declaratio secundum
Rabbi Moysen cap. 67 est quod, cum causatum omne causam habeat,
et omnen factum factorem, et omnis factor unus post unum reducitur
ad factoremprimumtamquamadagentemet efficientemprincipalem,
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tunc sequitur necessario, quod ipse est efficiens omnium, et causarum
et causatorum, utpote “causa prima plus est influens in causata omnia
quam cause secundarie.”
59. Cap. 11 (F f. 150ra; R f. 155va; V f. 80rb)—Liber de causis, XXIII(XXIV), 176,
p. 185, l. 20–23
Preterea, sicut dicit RabbiMoyses cap. 83, “omne, quod exit de potentia
ad actum, habet extractorem” sui generis cum eo, idest extracto, alio-
quin quidlibet extraheret quodlibet, vel adminus casualis esset extrac-
tio, ut esset convenientia inter extrahentem et extractum in forma.
Prima autem causa nullius generis est cum alio, cum se habeat secun-
dum unam dispositionem ad omnia causata, secundum quod dicitur
De causis. Quare, ut fiat differentia extractorum in singulis generibus,
necesse est, ut preter ipsum sint extractores eiusdem generis cum
extractis.
60. Cap. 11 (F f. 150rb; R f. 156ra; V f. 80va)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1
Scito igitur, quod intentio Augustini in sermonibus suis, cum dicit
Deum formatorem et formas induci per ipsum in inferioribus, est non
excludere ipsum ab operibus secundarium agentium, immo potius
attribuere ei principalitatem, cum “causa primaria plus influat,” secun-
dum quod dictum est superius. […] Et hec est via respondendi ad
omnes auctoritates, que videntur attribuere formationem rerum
immediate creatori.
61. Cap. 12 (F f. 151ra; R f. 156va; V f. 81ra)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1
Quod dicunt homines vilius attribui creatori et nobilius creature, si
creatori attribueretur creatio potentie et creature productio actus, hoc
verum est. Si excluderetur creator a productione actus per creaturam,
⟨falsum est⟩. Nunc autem ipse est “magis influens” in actum “quam
secundaria” et immediata.
62–63. Cap. 15 (F f. 157ra; R f. 160vb; V f. 85rb)—Liber de causis, XVII(XVIII), 143,
p. 173, l. 38; 148, p. 174, l. 54–61
Dico igitur sermone abreviato, quod circumstantia cause denotata in
propositione potest dicere aliquid in faciente aut in facto. Si in faciente,
sic non dicit nisi causam moventem, sicut supra dictum est. Quod
autem hec propositio dicat circumstantiam moventem, manifestum
est per propositionem De causis, que est quod “omnia sunt propter
ens primum,” sicut patet in expositione Alfarabii. Si autem dicat aliq-
uid in facto, sic dicit finem eius ultimum, idest ordinem ad factorem.
Et per hoc solvitur ratio eorum, qui posuerunt contrarium, quod etiam
universum habet aliquid extra se, propter quod est, videlicet factorem
eius, sicut exercitus habet extra se ducem, prout supra dictum est.
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64–66. Cap. 25 (F f. 170ra; R f. 173ra; V f. 95vb)—Liber de causis, XX(XXI), 162,
p. 180, l. 48–49; XIX(XX), 155, p. 177, l. 97–98; 157, p. 177, l. 3–5
Ipso etiam indigent omnia. Namomne causatumdependet a sua causa
et eget ipsa, ut sit et permaneat, sicut superius dictum est in sermone
de causa. Et ideo indiget influentia cause sue. Ipse autem est in se
sufficientissimus, quia simplicissimus in omnia alia, largissimus, quia
summe communicativum. Et ideo quantum ad utramque partem dic-
tum est De causis propositione, quod “primum est dives” quantum ad
privationem indigentie in se ipso, et “magis dives” quantum ad influ-
entiam in alios. […] Item ex tertia proprietate principii, quod est, quod
a principiatis separatum, quoniam secundum Aristotelem aliud ab
hiis, quorum est principium, manifestum est ipsum esse principium,
secundum quod dicit de ipso Avicenna VIII Philosophie prime cap. 1,
quod principium omnium est unum, quod est discretum ab omnibus,
que sunt. Ipse enim est impermixtus omnibus, secundum quod dicit
propositioDe causis quod “causa prima regit res creatas omnes, preter
quodcommisceatur cumeis,” quia regensomnia stat inunitate suapro-
pria, secundum quod dicit ibi Commentator. Ipse enim est, qui non
communicat alicui eorum, que sunt, nec cui aliquid communicat, sicut
dicit Avicenna lib. VIII cap. 5 et lib. IX cap. 1. Quare per hanc viamman-
ifestum est ipsum esse principium.
67–68. Cap. 25 (F f. 170rb; R f. 173rb;V f. 99ra)—Liber de causis, XXIII(XXIV), 176,
p. 185, l. 20–23
Amplius, etsi primus adest omnibus, non tamen omnia assunt primo,
sicut dicit Augustinus super Principium Iohannis. Et eorum, que
assunt, non omnia assunt uniformiter, quoniam “causa prima est in
omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non
existunt in prima secundum dispositionem unam,” secundum quod
exponit ibidemCommentator. Et propter hoc que assunt ipsi in dispo-
sitione propinquiori, erunt fortiora et perfectiora, sicut superius dixit
Avencebrol.
69. Cap. 27 (F f. 172va; R f. 175vb; V f. 97vb)—Liber de causis, XXX(XXI), 210,
p. 198, l. 43–44
Preterea ex definitione tertia, que est, quod perfectum est, cui nihil
accidit, apposita huic, quod habetur ex propositione De causis, quod
“actio primi et substantia est inmomento eternitatis,” et similiter quod
habetur ex Aristotele III Phisicorum cap. 5 et Averroe, quod in eternis
non est differentia inter posse vel contingere et id quod est; sequitur
necessario, quodnihil ei accidit; quare est perfectissimus.Quippequid-
quid est possibile, presens est ei, sicut dicit ultima definitio.
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70–81. Cap. 28 (F f. 173vb–174ra; R f. 177ra–b; V f. 98vb–99ra)—Liber de causis,
XXVIII(XXIX), 199, p. 192, l. 52–53; 201, p. 193, l. 57–60; XXVII(XXVIII),
194, p. 191, l. 25–26; VI(VII), 64, p. 149, l. 65; XXVII(XXVIII), 194, p. 191,
l. 25–26; XXVIII(XXIX), 199, p. 192, l. 52–53; VI(VII), 64, p. 149, l. 65;
XXVII(XXVIII), 195–197, p. 191, l. 27–192, l. 41; XXVII(XXVIII), 197–198,
p. 192, l. 42–48; XXIV(XXV), 181, p. 187, l. 61–62; XXVIII(XXIX), 199, p. 192,
l. 52–53; XXIV(XXV), 181, p. 187, l. 61–62; 182, p. 187, l. 66–67; XXIV(XXV),
184, p. 187, l. 70–188, l. 81; XXV(XXVI), 187, p. 188, l. 83–84; XXV(XXVI),
187, p. 188, l. 83–84; XXVIII(XXIX), 199, p. 192, l. 52–53; XXV(XXVI), 188,
p. 189, l. 93–95; 188, p. 189, l. 95–2; 188, p. 188, l. 87–189, l. 90; 188, p. 189,
l. 92–93
Preterea ex propositione De causis habetur, quod “simplex est sub-
stantia, que stat per se ipsam,” hoc est “per essentiam suam,” quia si
non stat per essentiam suam, sed per partes, tunc non est substantia
simplex, sed potius compositum ex partibus compositis. Similiter, si
habet aliunde fixionem stationis sue quam ex essentia sua, simplex
non est. Amplius, si non stat per essentiam suam, ex alio generata est;
substantia simplex a nullo est generata; quare non est ipsa substan-
tia, que non stat per essentiam suam, sicut manifestat Expositor in
eodem loco. Stare enim per essentiam suam et esse simplex conver-
tuntur, sicut patet expropositionepredicta et immediateprecedente,
que est, quod “omnis substantia stans per essentiam suam simplex est
et non dividitur.” […]
Amplius ex prop. 7 alia adhuc habetur descriptio simplicitatis, que
est, quod simplex est “substantia, que non dividitur,” que necessario
infertur ex duabus supradictis invicem connexis sic: “omnis substantia
stans per essentiam suam est substantia, que non dividitur;” sed “sim-
plex est substantia, que stat per essentiam suam;” igitur simplex est
“substantia, quenondividitur.”Minorhuiusdeclarata est.Maiorpropo-
sitio declaratur a Commentatore, videlicet quod substantia stans per
essentiam suam est indivisibilis, quia si esset divisibilis, non staret
per essentiam suam, sed per partes; aut igitur que per se stant, aut
non per se stant. Si priori modo, igitur singule partes stant per essen-
tiam suam sicut totum. Et hoc est impossibile, quia ex eis, quorum
unumquodque stat per essentiam suam, non fit unum. Si per partes,
que non per se stant, hoc est impossibile, quia substantia, que stat per
essentiam suam, stet per partes, que per se non stant. Igitur erit ter-
tio modo, quod stat per essentiam suam, ita tamen quod per partes,
quarumuna stat per essentiamsuamet alteranon. Sedhoc est impossi-
bile, quia si sic esset, non esset sufficiens sibi, igitur non esset stans per
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essentiam suam; quod est contra positum. Quare necesse est omnem
substantiam stantem per essentiam suam esse simplicem et indivisi-
bilem. Nam si componeretur, tunc haberet partes, quibus staret. Quod
non potest esse, sicut iam dictum est.
Item “universitas eius non esset sufficiens per se ipsam, cum indi-
geat partibus, ex quibus componatur.” Ex quo sequitur, quod omnis
substantia stans per essentiam suam est substantia simplex, que non
dividitur. Et hoc est intentum in hac parte.
Item ex prop. 25 colligitur adhuc alia ratio simplicis, que est, quod sim-
plex est substantia, que non generatur ex re alia, et hoc habetur ex
25, que est, quod “omnis substantia stans per essentiam suam est non
generata ex re alia,” et predicta, quod “substantia simplex est substan-
tia, que stat per essentiam suam.” Igitur substantia simplex est substan-
tia, que non generatur ex re alia.
Maior huius, videlicet quod “substantia, que stat per essentiam, est non
generata ex re alia,” declaratur per Commentatorem sic: Omne gene-
ratum ex re alia est diminutum, et “indigens, ut compleat, eam ex qua
generatur”; sed substantia stans per essentiam suamnon est diminuta,
nec sic indigens; quare non est generata ex re alia.Veritati primepropo-
sitionis attestatur ipsa “generatio, que non est nisi via a diminutione ad
complementum.” Quapropter sequitur ex predicitis, quod “substantia
simplex non generatur ex re alia.”
Preterea ex prop. 26 habetur adhuc alia ratio simplicis, et est, quod
simplex est “substantia, que non cadit sub corruptione,” que similiter
sequitur ex duabus, quarum prima est ipsa 26, et est: “Substantia stans
per essentiam suam non cadit sub corruptione.” Et altera est 29, quam
premisi, hec scilicet: “Simplex est substantia stans per essentiam
suam;” quare simplex non cadit sub corruptione.
Maior huius declaratur a Commentatore, scilicet quod substantia
stans per se ipsam non cadit sub corruptione per huiusmodi propo-
sitiones: “omnis causati cadentis sub corruptione non fit corruptio nisi
per separationem a sua causa;” sed nullius stantis per essentiam suam
est separatio a sua causa; quare nullius talis est corruptio.
Medium patet, quia si possibile esset stantem per essentiam suam
separari a sua causa, “possibile esset eam separari a sua essentia,” per
quam stat; quare possibile esset, ut “stans fixa per essentiam suam sine
essentia sua;” quod est inconveniens. Omne enim, quod stat per essen-
tiam suam, sibi est indeficiens, quia semper habet causam sue subsis-
tentie. Quare impossibile est aliquid tale cadere sub corruptione, quia
“causa et causatum” in omni tali semper “simul” sunt.
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82. Cap. 28 (F f. 174rb; R f. 177va; V f. 96rb)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8
Preterea sicut ipse (scil. Avencebrol) vult lib. V cap. 16, “substantia, quo
fuerit simplicior, eo formarumplurium est receptibilior.” Nam “compo-
sitio prohibet penetrationema formis.” Igitur quomaior est elongatio a
compositione, eo a receptionis formarum impeditione. Amplius, “sub-
stantia, quo corpulentior etmultiplicior, eo pauciores admittit formas.”
Quare quo simplicior, eo plurium erit formarum.
Et propter hoc “omnis intelligentia plena est formis,” sicut dicitur De
causis propositione. De hoc autem audies alia in sermone De intelli-
gentia, quomodo multe forme possunt esse in una re simplici, et eo
plures, quo simplicior; tamen hoc scias, quod nobilitas annexa est sim-
plici.
Sapientiale, LIBER IV
83. Cap. 16 (F f. 109va inmarg.;R f. 117ra;V f. 118va)—Liberde causis, I, 1, p. 134,
l. 1–2
Preterea tu scis ex supradictis, quod materia non movetur nisi mota.
Igitur non numerat nisi numeretur. Igitur antequam numerat mate-
ria, est aliquid numerans, quod non potest esse nisi forma. Quamvis
enim materia causa per accidens est numerationis, tamen nisi aliquid
active numeret, numquamnumerabit. Omnis enim causa per accidens
reducitur ad per se et omnis passiva ad activam. Omnis etiam effectus
debetur per se et primo cause primarie, que plus influit, sicut dicitur
De causis prop. 1. Propter hoc cum actus, hoc est forma, dividat, sicut
dicit Aristoteles VII Metaphisice, et per consequens primum agens in
numeratione materie sit forme, simpliciter numeratio formarum sub-
stantialium debetur potius forme quammaterie.
84. Cap. 19 (F f. 112ra; R f. 119va; V f. 121ra)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1
Amplius, ex tractatu De principio manifestum est, quod omne princi-
piatum habet principium. Unde cum accidens sit principiatum, habe-
bit principium. Quero quod aut accidens aut substantiam. Si substan-
tiam, sed nullum principiatum est principium, nisi per suum prin-
cipium, nullumque causatum est causa, nisi per suam causam (nam
“omnis causa primaria plus influit,” sicut dicitur De causis prop. 1);
quare si substantia sit principiumaccidentis, hoc non erit nisi per prin-
cipia eius, cum ipsa substantia sit principiata; igitur a primo principia
substantiarum erunt principia accidentium. Si vero accidens habeat
principium accidens, de illo accidente similiter queritur et ibitur in
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infinitum, nisi tandem substantia sit principium accidentium. Et ita
revertetur idem quod prius, quod eadem sint principia substantiarum
et accidentium.
85. Cap. 22 (F f. 116vb; R f. 122vb–123ra;V f. 124ra–b)—Liberde causis, I, 1, p. 134,
l. 1
Preterea illud est verissime unum, quod non dividitur intellectu; omne
compositum est divisibilis intellectu, sicut superius manifestavi tibi in
sermone De composito; quare primum compositum non est verissime
unum, et ideo potest esse principiummultorum,maxime cum sit prin-
cipium per multa, hoc est per principia sua, que sunt multa. Ipsum
enim non est principium nisi per sua principia, sicut nec causa secun-
daria nisi per primariam, secundum prop. De causis 1.
LIBER VI
86. Cap. 15 (F f. 246ra; R f. 201va–b; V f. 153va)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134,
l. 1–2
Et ex hoc estmanifestus error ille ingratissimi, qui negat seDeo debere,
sed nature, secundum quod dicit Seneca, De beneficiis IV, quia “insita
nobis omniumetatumet actuumomniumqueartiumsemina,magister
ex occulto Deus producit ingenia.” Unde sicut supra dictum est, prima
et principalis natura, ex qua hec natura inferior dirigitur et guber-
natur, Deus est et divina ratio mundo et mundi partibus inserta. Et
propter hoc, quoniam “omnis causa primaria est plus influens,” sicut
diciturDecausisprop. 1, magis debet causatum suumesse cause prime
quam secunde. Et ideo omnis creatura magis debet creatori quam
nature.
87. Cap. 20 (F f. 196ra; R f. 208va; V f. 159ra)—Liber de causis, XX(XXI), 162,
p. 180, l. 48–49
Scito igitur proprietates primi et descriptiones eius, et primo quod pri-
mumest illud, quod est necessarium in esse sequentis, sicut dicit Aver-
roes super V Phisicorum. Item, primum est, quod non indiget secundo,
sed econverso, hoc est quo indiget secundum, sicut vult idem super
VIII Phisicorum cap. 12. Item, primumest, quod est ante aliud, sicut vult
Aristoteles XVI De animalibus cap. 9. Item, primum est, quod est prius
secundum esse et definitionem, sicut vult Averroes super VIII Phisico-
rum cap. 12. Item, primum est, quod est causa medii et postremi, sed
permediumpostremi, sicut vult Aristoteles IIMetaphisice, cap. 2. Item,
primum est, quod “per se dives et est dives magis,” sicut habetur De
causis prop. 20.
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88. Cap. 26 (F f. 205va; R f. 216rb;V f. 166rb)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8
Dico igitur tibi secundum sententiam Augustini et Platonis, quod
triplex est esse rei, videlicet in mente divina, in intellectuali natura,
in propria existentia; et quod esse eius in natura intellectiva, anima
videlicet et intelligentia, medium est inter esse primum et tertium; et
quod omnes forme, que exprimuntur inmateria, prius naturaliter sunt
concreate in intelligentia sive anima, quoniam natura pares sint, sicut
dicit Augustinus De libero arbitrio lib. II. Et hoc est consonum propo-
sitioni De causis, que dicit quod “omnis intelligentia plena est formis.”
Hoc esse verummanifestat sermo Augustini […].
Sapientiale, LIBER VII
89–93. Cap. 10 (F f. 224rb–va; R f. 249va; V f. 180rb)—Liber de causis, XVI(XVII),
138, p. 171, l. 15–16; 139–142, p. 171, l. 17–173, l. 37; VI(VII), 64, p. 149, l. 65;
XX(XXI), 162, p. 180, l. 48–49; 163–165, p. 180, l. 50–181, l. 67
Per naturam ordinis et reductionis creaturarum ad primum est pos-
sibile declarare id idem. Nam quidquid est a primo, provenit ab eo
secundum ordinem, secundum quod dicit Algazel II Prime philosophie
cap. 12. Et ideo reducuntur ad ipsum secundum ordinem, sicut vult
Avicenna X cap. 1, quoniam eadem est via reductionis, que est proces-
sionis. Reductio autem ad primum est secundum appropinquationem
maiorem et minorem, et hec secundum simplicitatem maiorem et
minorem, secundum quod habetur De causis prop. 17 et Expositore
super eandem, quod omnis virtus, quo primo propinquior, eo simpli-
cior et infinitior et in operatione mirabilior, et per hoc nobilior, quia
nobilius in omni genere est simplicius, secundum quod habetur ab
Averroe super XI cap. 24. Ex quibus omnibus sequitur, quod creatura
primo in ordine naturarum vicinissima est simplicissima; sed talis non
potest esse nisi intelligentia, quia vere simplex est, quod nec est com-
positum neque delatum super rem aliam, prout habetur ex prop. De
causis 7, 27 et Commentatore.
94–95. Cap. 11 (F f. 225vb; R f. 250vb; V f. 181va)—Liber de causis, XXX(XXI), 210,
p. 198, l. 43–47
Preterea per necessitatem mensure, que exigitur inter temporale et
eternum, arguitur idem sic: res, que cadit secundum omnes sui dispo-
sitiones in tempore et secundum substantiam et secundum actionem,
seiuncta est a re, que cadit sub eternitate secundum omnes sui dis-
positiones et in substantia et in actione. Coniunctio autem non est
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nisi in rebus similibus. Propter hoc necessaria est res aliqua media,
cuius substantia cadit in eternitate, idest supra tempus, et actio in
tempore, quoniam, sicut inter tempus et eternum est sempiternum
medium ita, quod mensuratur sempiterno, erit medium inter id, quod
mensuratur eterno, et id, quod mensuratur tempore, quoniam tem-
pus est infra sempiternum et eternum est supra sempiternum. Et hec
ratio est Avencebrolis lib. III cap. 2, et habetur ex prop. De causis 31 et
Alfarabio super eandem, videlicet quod “inter rem, cuius substantia
et actio sunt in momento eternitatis, et inter rem, cuius substantia et
actio sunt in momento temporis, est medium. Et est illud, cuius sub-
stantia est inmomento eternitatis et actio inmomento temporis.” Non
est autemdubium, quin natura corporea secundumquod talis utroque
modo sit in tempore. Quare inter naturam corpoream et factorem pri-
mum, cuius mensura est eternitas, est aliqua substantia media.
96–97. Cap. 11 (F f. 227rb; R f. 252ra–b; V f. 182vb)—Liber de causis, XXIX(XXX),
204sqq., p. 194, l. 72sqq.; 204, p. 194, l. 73–80
Hec autem substantia intellectiva dirigens naturam in suis operationi-
bus intelligentia ⟨est⟩ secundum Aristotelem, prout vult Averroes
super XI cap. 6. Unde non est mirum, sicut dicit, quod quamvis natura
non intelligat de huiusmodi que facit, tamen facit illa aliquam indu-
cendo intentionemet hoc demonstrat, inquit, quod aliquid rememorat
ipsamde causis nobilioribus. Verum, ut ante demonstratumest, imme-
diatus motor nature non potest esse motor primus universalis, et ideo
necessario est intelligentia. Et causa est secundumAverroem in eodem
loco, quia etsi ars unaprincipalis divina, qua regitur natura tota propter
hoc, quod ipse idem est rector, qui est auctor, tamen, quia plura sunt
artificiata et diversa innatura, que fiunt permulta etmultipliciamedia,
ideo necesse est, quod sint plures artes sub illa arte una prima ab ipsa
regulate, per quas quidem regulantur motus et operationes in superi-
oribus et per superiora in inferioribus. Plures autem artes, secundum
ipsum, plures sunt intelligentie. SecundumAlfarabiumsuperprop.De
causis 30 probatur idem per propositiones, quas ponit ibidem. Et est
prima quod “creata sequuntur se adinvicem,” alioquin non essent ordi-
nata inter se, quod negat Aristoteles, XI, cap. 25.
Altera propositionum est, quod “substantiam superiorem non sequi-
tur nisi substantia ei similis et non dissimilis,” quantum est possibile,
ut assimiletur. Et hoc patet ex priori. […] Quare sequitur, quod con-
tinuatio substantiarum ad primum ⟨fit⟩ per assimilationem maiorem
et minorem, ut temporalium ad eternam per sempiternas et sempiter-
nalium, quarum una est in tempore, per illam, que est supra tempus,
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idest temporis extensionem, que quidem extensio sit mensura pri-
marumactionum illarumsubstantiarum.Hec autemcontinuatio inter-
cisa esset, nisi esset intelligentia. Est igitur intelligentia.
98. Cap. 12 (F f. 227va; R f. 252rb; V f. 183ra)—Liber de causis, XXVII(XXVIII),
196, p. 192, l. 37–41
Amplius, principium per se notum est, quod simplicia naturaliter sunt
priora quam composita ex illis; et causa est, quia omne compositum
dividitur in ea, ex quibus componitur, secundum Aristotelem VI Phisi-
corum cap. 1, et etiam in illa resolvitur, secundum quod dicit Avence-
brol lib. II cap. 16. Si igitur est aliquid compositum ex duabus naturis,
necesse est, quod prioritas illarum ad compositum ex ipsis sit priori-
tas nature et in ordine essendi. Si igitur inveniatur aliquid compositum
ex duabus naturis, quarum una est nobilior alia, secundum quod dicit
Alfarabius super 28 prop. De causis, quod omne compositum habet
unam partem meliorem et alteram viliorem, et item inveniatur vilior
pars illius compositi, ita prior in ordine essendi, ut non tantum sit in
ipso composito, sed prius in se habet esse preter compositum, tunc
necesse est, quod inveniatur pars nobilior prior per se etiam preter
compositum, sicut si inveniatur compositio ex auro et argento, quod
est electrum, invenitur utrumque seorsum prius composito.
99–101. Cap. 12 (F f. 227vb; R f. 252va–b; V f. 183rb)—Liber de causis, VI(VII), 71,
p. 151, l. 1–152, l. 5; VI(VII), 64, p. 149, l. 65; VI(VII), 70, p. 1551, l. 96
Ex quibus omnibus et consimilibus ⟨patet⟩, quod non esset perfectis-
simum in operibus altissimi, nisi esset creatura talis incorporea non
unita corpori. Imperfectum enim necessario requirit perfectum, et
ideo nobiliora et perfectiora priora sunt in esse quamminus nobilia et
perfecta. Et ideo si conceditur esse de posterioribus, concedetur de pri-
oribus, secundum sermonem Aristotelis III Metaphisice cap. 11, quod
id, quod est nobilius, est prius. Et ad hoc agit, quod vult Aristoteles in
eodem libro et capitulo secundum Averroem, videlicet quod id, quod
est minoris divisibilitatis, est prius eo, quod est maioris. Non est autem
dubium, quin omne corpori unitum naturaliter divisibilius est quam
non unitum. Nam tale omne dividitur secundum motum et opera-
tionem ad minus et movetur aliquo modo motu corporis, sicut dicit
Alfarabius superprop.Decausis 7, et ita divisibile secundumaccidens,
quamvis non secundum essentiam, sicut distinguit Averroes de indivi-
sibili essentialiter et secundum accidens super III Celi et mundi cap. 3.
Unde cum divisibile reducatur ad primum principium, quod est indi-
visibile omni genere divisionis, per indivisibile et minus indivisibile
per magis indivisibile et “intelligentia est substantia, que non dividi-
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tur,” sicut dicitur De causis 7, tunc per ipsam intelligentiam corpori
non unita est omniumaliorum secundumordinemessendi ad primum
indivisibile tamquam posteriorum per prius reductio. Et iuxta hoc
potest fieri argumentum per reductionem entium per rationem uni-
tatis. Namomne indivisibilius uni primo propinquius, secundumquod
dicit Alfarabius super 7 De causis, quod intelligentia, “quia appropin-
quat uni, fit unum et non dividitur.” Igitur quod est divisibilius, non
est uni primo propinquius. Propinquius autem est uni substantia, que
non dividitur nec alteri unitur quantum ad rationem unitatis; quare
talis erit uni primo propinquissima.
102. Cap. 13 (F f. 229ra; R f. 253vb; V f. 184ra)—Liber de causis, I, 1, p. 134, l. 1–2
Quod autem dicit Aristoteles non esse substantiam abstractam, que
non moveat, non tollit intelligentias nudas corpori non unitas, quo-
niam et ipse movent sicut amata substantias moventes coniunctas,
ad quarum motum moventur celi. Et ideo cum “causa primaria plus
est influens quam secundaria,” secundum prop. De causis 1, motus
etiam corporum celestium magis debentur intelligentiis nudis sepa-
ratis quam coniunctis. Quod autem dicit Aristoteles substantiam, que
non movet, esse in dispositione diminuta, immo potius otiosam,
secundum Averroem, falsum est, sicut tu postea scies.
103. Cap. 18 (F f. 216ra; R f. 242rb;V f. 188va)—Liber de causis, IX(X), 92, p. 158,
l. 8
Et ratio huius est, quod omnia inferiora creata sunt in intellectuali
⟨intelligentia⟩ angelorum et per consequens animarum, sicut dicit
Agustinus Super Genesim libro II cap. 2, addens quod “discretio sive
species aquarum, terrarum, nature lignorum, herbarum” et ceterorum
omnium prius facta sunt in intellectuali intelligentia quam in propria
existentia. Et ideo dicitur De causis propositione, quod “omnis intelli-
gentia plena est formis.” Singule autem forme [singule] sunt unitates,
ex quibus constituitur numerus, qui non est accidens, sicut supra dic-
tum est in sermone De numero.
104. Cap. 23 (F f. 222ra; R f. 247rb; V f. 193ra)—Liber de causis, XIX(XX), 159,
p. 178, l. 25–179, l. 31
Item omne agens, cuius actio non est sua substantia, est agens non per
se totum, sed aliquid sui; sed omne agens preter primum est agens,
cuius actio non est sua substantia; igitur omne agens preter primum
est agens non per se totum, sed aliquid sui.
Ratio primi est, quod est agens per se ipsum et non per virtutem et
est agens per virtutem et non per se ipsum, sicut dicit Avicenna VI
Metaphisice cap. 2. Agens priori modo est agens primus, qui agit per
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suumesse et ideo est agens unita actione, sicut dicitur super 20Decau-
sis. Omne autem agens preter ipsum est agens per virtutem et non per
se ipsum, scilicet totum, et ideo suum agere non est suum esse, sicut
sua actio non est sua substantia.
COMPARATIO
F f. 231va Liber de causis, XX(XXI), 162, p. 180, l. 48–49
Preterea primum est dives per se ipsum et est dives maius, sicut
habetur De causis prop. 20.
F f. 237va Liber de causis, IV, 37, p. 142, l. 37
Quid autem sit nomen reale compositi primi, ut habet esse preter
animam, non video esse, quia uidetur dicere illa propositio De cau-
sis: “Prima rerum creaturarum est esse,” sicut postea patebit in capi-
tulo De ente et esse.
F 238va Liber de causis, IV, 37, p. 142, l. 37
Namprimumdonumdivine bonitatis est esse et forte ob hoc dicitur
De causis, quod “prima rerum creatarum est esse” et ideo omnium
esse est a primo esse.
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